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Water resource management is a multifaceted issue that becomes more complex 
when considering multiple nations’ interdependence upon a single shared transboundary 
river basin.  With over 200 transboundary river basins worldwide shared by two or more 
countries, it is important to develop tools to allow riparian countries to cooperatively 
manage these shared and often limited water resources.  Cooperative game theory 
provides tools for determining if cooperation can exist across jurisdictional boundaries 
through a suite of mathematical tools that measure the benefits of cooperation among 
basin stakeholders.  Cooperative game theory is also useful for transboundary negotiation 
because it provides a range of solutions which will satisfy all players in the game and 
provides methods to fairly and equitably allocate the gains of that cooperation to all 
participating stakeholders, if that cooperation is shown to be possible. This dissertation 
applies cooperative game theory concepts to the Rio Grande/Bravo basin in North 
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America as a case study.  The Rio Grande/Bravo forms the 1,200 km border between the 
United States and Mexico.  A comprehensive water resources planning model was 
developed for the basin including the major water users, water related infrastructure 
including reservoirs, and water policy logic related to the bi-national water sharing 
agreements.  The water planning model is used to calculate the characteristic functions 
for the cooperative game analysis.  For the Water Demand Reduction Game, the largest 
agricultural users, District 005, District 025 and the Texas Watermaster Section below 
Falcon were defined individual players.  The cooperative analysis was between the 
individual players rather than the countries.  In addition to the cooperative analysis, 
performance measures for water deliveries were calculated to determine if water delivery 
was improved to each player under the cooperative game.  The results show that the 
amount of additional water to the downstream players may not be large enough to induce 
cooperation.  The small amount of increase in water deliveries is related to the large 
system losses as the water travels downstream over a long distance and a division of 
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Water resources management is a complex and varied topic.  Population growth 
and economic development place added demands on limited water resources.  
Transboundary river basins, or basins that are shared by two or more countries, add 
complexity to water management.  These basins are subject to laws and regulations of all 
countries that they flow through rather than just a single country. More than 200 river 
basins around the world have been identified as being shared by two or more countries 
(Wolf, 2002).   
Conflicts arise in transboundary river basins when asymmetries exist with respect 
to information, power, or location (Just and Netanyahu, 1998).  Asymmetric information 
arises when riparian countries (countries sharing a transboundary basin) have differing 
access to and quality of data regarding a basin.  Asymmetric power can be related to 
either wealth or military power.  Usually, power asymmetry allows some riparian 
countries to develop more water projects, such as reservoirs or irrigation systems, than 
other riparian countries (Just and Netanyahu, 1998).  Location asymmetry refers to 
upstream - downstream geographic location of riparian users in a basin.  All of these 
asymmetries allow some countries to have strategic power over other countries in water 
negotiations within a basin (Just and Netanyahu, 1998).  
To overcome asymmetries among riparian countries and improve the management 
of water resources, researchers have applied cooperative game theory to this problem.  
Cooperative game theory provides tools for determining if cooperation can exist in a 
basin through a suite of mathematical tools that measure the benefits of cooperation 
among basin stakeholders (and across jurisdictional boundaries in the research considered 
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here).  Cooperative game theory also provides methods to calculate fair and equitable 
allocations of cooperative gains to stakeholders if the cooperation is possible.  
To determine the possible benefits of cooperation among riparian users in a river 
basin, water planning models can be very helpful. Often these models are simplified with 
emphasis placed on the game theory calculations.  However, coupling the game theory 
calculations with a comprehensive, and rather detailed, water planning model may 
increase the reliability of the outcomes.  Many models exist for the hydraulics and 
hydrology of river basins.  These models are powerful tools, which when used 
appropriately allow more informed decisions regarding river basin management.  Models 
can be used for reservoir operations, water availability forecasting, water allocation, flood 
modeling, and even environmental restoration.  Using a comprehensive river basin model 
with cooperative game theory can give transboundary river basin stakeholders a powerful 
tool for negotiation and increasing basin-wide benefits. 
 
1.1 Background 
The Rio Grande has been selected as a study basin for the application of 
cooperative game theory concepts to a transboundary basin.  The Rio Grande, or Río 
Bravo del Norte as it is known in Mexico, is the fifth longest river in North America 
flowing 3,107 km from its headwaters in the San Juan Mountains of southern Colorado to 
the Gulf of Mexico. The Rio Grande/Bravo flows through the Chihuahuan Desert, which 
is the largest desert in North America (Figure 1-1).  The river flows through the three 
U.S. states of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas and the four Mexican states of 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.  Upon entering Texas from New 
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Mexico near El Paso, the river forms over 2,000 km of international border between 
Mexico and the United States (Patino et al., 2007).  The river will be referred to 
throughout this document as the Rio Grande/Bravo. 
The Rio Grande/Bravo basin is home to over 10 million people (WWF, 2007).  
Currently municipal demands account for only 11% of the total surface water demands in 
the basin, while irrigation accounts for 88% of these same demands.  Mexico irrigates 
approximately 4,800 km2 in the basin (CNA, 2003), while the United States irrigates 
about 4,020 km2 (The Alliance for the Rio Grande Heritage et al., 2000). Of the 4,020 
km2 irrigated in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin in the U.S., only about 400 km2 lie upstream 
from Texas in New Mexico and Colorado (The Alliance for the Rio Grande Heritage et 
al., 2000). 
 
The United States and Mexico have two major legal agreements for sharing the 
waters of the Rio Grande/Bravo.  These agreements are the 1906 Convention (IBWC, 
1906) and the 1944 Treaty (IBWC, 1944).  The 1906 Convention for the “Equitable 
Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande” deals with dividing the waters of the Rio 
Grande/Bravo above Ft. Quitman, Texas for irrigation purposes (IBWC, 1906).  Under 
the 1906 Convention, Mexico agreed to the construction of Elephant Butte Reservoir in 
New Mexico and the U.S. guaranteed Mexico a total delivery of 74 million cubic meters 
(MCM) of water annually.  This water is delivered according to a monthly schedule, 
outlined in the 1906 Convention, through the Acequia Madre canal near Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico.  The U.S. completed construction of Elephant Butte Reservoir in 1916 to ensure 
the scheduled deliveries to Mexico as well as to provide for their own irrigation demands.  
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The 1906 Convention contains a provision stating that in event of drought, the water 
deliveries to Mexico may be reduced in the same proportion as reduced deliveries to the 
U.S. in the stretch of the river near El Paso (IBWC, 1906). 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Location of the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin 
 
The 1944 Treaty provides the framework for allocating the waters of the Rio 
Grande/Bravo below Ft. Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico (IBWC, 1944).  This 
treaty authorized the construction of two international reservoirs, La Amistad and Falcon, 
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which are managed jointly by the International Boundary and Water Commission 
(IBWC) and the Comisión Internacional de Limites y Aguas (CILA).  These reservoirs 
and other projects were built for flood control and to increase irrigation capacity in the 
lower basin (IBWC, 1944).   
The 1944 Treaty divides the water of the Rio Grande/Bravo from Fort Quitman to 
the Gulf of Mexico.  Article IV of the 1944 Treaty allocates Mexico all of the waters of 
the San Juan and Alamo rivers and one-half of the flow in the main channel of the Rio 
Grande below Falcon Reservoir.  Mexico is also allocated two-thirds of the flow in the 
main channel from the tributaries of the Rios Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo 
Escondido, and Salado, and Arroyo Las Vacas.  These allocations to Mexico are on the 
conditions that the United States receive from these same six streams not less than 
431million cubic meters  (MCM) annually as an average in five-year cycles.  Under 
Article IV, the U.S. receives one-half of all other flows not otherwise allotted, in the main 
channel of the Rio Grande/Bravo.  The United States also receives all of the streamflow 
of the Pecos and Devils rivers, all the streamflow from Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe, 
and Pinto creeks, all the discharge from Goodenough Spring, and one-half of the flow in 
the main channel of the Rio Grande below the Falcon Reservoir. Additionally, the U.S. is 
allocated one-third of the flow reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the 
Rios Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, Salado, and Arroyo Las Vacas, as 
long as this allocation is not less than 431 MCM annually as an average in five-year 
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cycles.  Lastly, the U.S. also receives one-half of all other flows not otherwise allotted, in 
the main stem of the Rio Grande (IBWC, 1944). 
When these agreements were implemented, there was adequate flow to satisfy the 
treaty allocations to the respective countries.  However, recent prolonged drought has 
brought to light the shortcomings of these set water agreements.  The Rio Grande/Bravo 
is considered to be one of the most water stressed basins in the world.  Rapid population 
growth and economic development, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border region, have 
placed additional strain on already limited water resources of the basin.  In March 2007, 
the Rio Grande/Bravo was named one of the world’s top ten endangered rivers by the 
World Wildlife Federation (WWF) (WWF, 2007).  The WWF listed the Rio 
Grande/Bravo because over extraction of water has led to a multitude of physical 
problems for the river. 
Smaller snow packs in the mountains and recent droughts coupled with over 
extraction have led to an extremely water stressed situation in the Rio Grande/Bravo 
basin (WWF, 2007).  The basin exhibits symptoms of over extraction including low to no 
flow in sections of the river, proliferation of exotic species, and increased salinity.  At 
times the river stops flowing in two sections of the basin.  The first section of the river, 
known as the Forgotten River, is the reach of the river which extends along the Mexico-
U.S. border, from El Paso/Ciudad Juarez to above the confluence with the Rio Conchos.  
The Forgotten River is remote, sparsely populated and little scientific information is 
known, compared to the rest of the Rio Grande/Bravo and often has little to no water 
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flowing in this particular reach (Landis, 2001; Teasley and McKinney, 2005).   The 
second section where flow has historically stopped is at the mouth of the river at the Gulf 
of Mexico. 
Numerous times in the past, the Rio Grande/Bravo has stopped flowing into the 
Gulf of Mexico. Most recently in February 2001, the streamflow became so small that a 
sandbar developed at the mouth of the river. The formation of this sandbar prevents the 
river from draining into the Gulf of Mexico, effectively stopping the river (Texas Center 
for Policy Studies, 2002). 
Other symptoms of a water crisis include increased salinity in the lower basin.  
Due to the increase in salinity, salt water species of fish have been found in the river as 
far inland as Falcon international reservoir, approximately 440 km (275 miles) upstream 
from the Gulf of Mexico.  This increase in salinity has forced many native freshwater 
species out of this reach of the river (WWF, 2007). 
Invasive species are also causing problems for the Rio Grande/Bravo.  One 
example is Tamarisk (Tamarix spp.) or salt cedar, an exotic species introduced into the 
basin in the 1920’s.  This invasive species has found favorable conditions in the basin.  
Salt cedar is a highly drought and salinity resistant plant allowing it to thrive in the arid 
environments found along the Rio Grande/Bravo and allows it to overtake native riparian 
vegetation for habitat (DeLoach et al., 2000).  Additionally, salt cedar consumes large 
quantities of water, contributes to the salinity in the river and chokes stream channels. 
Large stands of salt cedar have choked many sections of the Rio Grande/Bravo above 
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Amistad international reservoir and the lower Rio Conchos.  The construction of large 
dams in the Rio Grande basin has changed the streamflows from conditions which favor 
native plant species to conditions that promote the growth and spread of salt cedar 
(Everitt, 1980). 
Institutional problems have recently been highlighted in the basin.  Due to 
prolonged and severe drought conditions in the late 1990’s, Mexico was unable to satisfy 
treaty deliveries as specified by the 1944 Treaty.  Mexico had a treaty-defined water debt 
to the U.S. and tensions increased between Texas and Mexican farmers (Texas Center for 
Policy Studies, 2002).   This extreme drought led to the creation of IBWC Minutes 307 
and 308 for joint data sharing, drought management and movement towards development 
of sustainable management in the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin (IBWC, 2002). 
Due to the size and complexity of the Rio Grande/Bravo basin, conventional 
segment-specific approaches to water planning have become inadequate to meet the 
challenges of improving basin wide water management.  To better satisfy sustainable 
water management objectives while meeting current needs in all sectors, in all segments, 
and in both nations, the Physical Assessment Project is developing a “whole basin” water 
resources planning model to analyze the physical opportunities for improved water 
management (NHI, 2006). 
The Physical Assessment Project is a collaborative effort between technical and 
expert counterparts in Mexico and the United States aimed at exploring opportunities for 
improving management of the scarce water resources of the river through development 
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and analysis of management scenarios. The Physical Assessment project is a “whole 
system” planning effort by 20 technical institutions, which are primarily non-
governmental, from both sides of the border.  The Project Steering Committee is 
comprised of The University of Texas at Austin, the Natural Heritage Institute, the 
University of Arizona, the Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, the Universidad 
Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de 
Monterrey, the World Wildlife Fund-Mexico, and the U.S. Geological Survey. 
The objective of the Physical Assessment Project is to examine scenarios for 
expanding the beneficial uses of the fixed water supply in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin to 
better satisfy an array of water management goals.  These management goals include 
making agriculture more resilient to periodic conditions of drought, improving the 
reliability of supplies to cities and towns, and restoring lost environmental functions in 
the river system. The Physical Assessment Project is focused on creating management 
scenarios that fall within the current water allocation structure in the basin including 
treaties, compacts, and water rights. A hydrologic planning model is being used to 
evaluate the management scenarios for both physical feasibility and the ability to provide 
mutual benefits to stakeholders in the basin (NHI, 2006) 
The Rio Grande/Bravo provides a good opportunity for the application of 
cooperative game theory.  Water management scenarios are being developed through the 
input of basin stakeholders in both countries indicating their willingness to cooperate.  
Application of cooperative game theory to this transboundary basin can show the players 
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what their increase in benefit may be under that cooperation and allows players to 
negotiate for a share of that increased benefit. 
1.2 Objectives 
This research is aimed at coupling cooperative game theory with a comprehensive 
water management model for a transboundary river basin.  The objectives of this 
dissertation are to: 
1. Construct and calibrate a water-planning model to represent the physical and 
institutional characteristics of a large scale, transboundary river basin (the Rio 
Grande basin) with multiple players, jurisdictions, and water uses in multiple 
sectors;  
2. Utilize the water-planning model to calculate values needed in the cooperative 
game theory calculations (characteristic function values); 
3. Create river basin games where players cooperate and learn the benefits of that 
cooperation.  The games in this research give players the opportunity to negotiate 
and divide the benefits of their cooperation;  
4. Create a cooperative game theory framework that can be used to evaluate the 
benefits of cooperation in other transboundary river basins and in future water 
management scenarios in the case study basin; and 




1.3 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters.  The Rio Grande/Bravo is used as a 
case study transboundary basin to meet the objectives set out in the first chapter.  The 
second chapter provides an introduction to cooperative game theory concepts and a 
review of literature related to the application of cooperative game theory in water 
resources with focus on transboundary river basins.  The methods for calculating the 
cooperative game theory values are outlined in the third chapter and the fourth chapter 
provides specific details of applying those methods to a selected water management game 
in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin. This chapter also describes in detail the water planning 
resources planning model developed for this application.  The results of this application 
are contained in the fifth chapter and, finally, conclusions and recommendations are 




2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cooperative game theory is applied to the Rio Grande/Bravo as a case study to 
determine the gains of cooperation, if they exist, for given water management scenarios.  
This section provides descriptions of concepts related to cooperative game theory and 
descriptions of applications of cooperative game theory to water resources problems with 
particular focus on specific applications to transboundary river basins.  
2.1 Game Theory  
First introduced formally by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 
1944 text Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, game theory is the mathematical 
analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation.  Game theory studies the way in which 
players strategically make decisions when the costs and benefits of each decision depend 
on the decisions of other players. 
To ensure that game theory calculations are completed in similar units of cost and 
benefit, Utility Theory is often applied.  Utility Theory assigns numerical values to 
outcomes to represent a player’s preference (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  
Assigning utility to a player’s outcomes ensures commensurate units for game theory 
calculations.  Utility may either be ordinal or cardinal.  Ordinal utilities simply order a 
player’s outcomes by preference, the higher utility value the more preferred the outcome.  
Cardinal utilities assign values based on axiomatic preferences utilizing lotteries in which 
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a player selects their preference in a series of random events.  Cardinal utilities are used 
when the ratios of the differences between outcomes are important (Straffin, 1993).  
Utility is a useful concept because players in a game may value the same things 
differently. For example a poorer country may value a dollar differently than a rich 
country values that same dollar.  
Games can be grouped into two major classes: non-cooperative and cooperative.  
In non-cooperative games, players only know their moves and strategically make 
decisions to maximize their benefits.  Non-cooperative games may be zero-sum or non-
zero-sum.  In zero-sum games, the benefit to one player is a loss to another.  The classic 
example of a non-cooperative game is the prisoner’s dilemma game, which was 
originally designed by Flood and Drescher in 1950 (Straffin, 2004). Albert Tucker later 
formalized the game and put it in the context of prison sentence payoffs and named the 
game the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game (Straffin, 1993). In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
there are two suspects held in separate rooms and each has to decide whether to confess 
or not confess to their crime.  Both prisoners must make a decision based on what they 
believe the other prisoner will do, because if one decides to confess while the other does 
not, the one who confesses gets a light sentence while the other gets a heavy sentence if 
he does not confess.  However if they both confess they both receive a light sentence and 
if they both do not confess they receive no sentence.  Each prisoner must make strategic 
decisions to receive the minimum sentence based on what they believe the other prisoners 
decision will be. 
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In cooperative games, all possible strategy sequences that could occur are 
determined and the consequences are made available to the players prior to play.  Players 
in a cooperative game have communication prior to the game and make binding 
agreements, known as coalitions.  Cooperative games allocate the costs and benefits of 
coalition decisions to the individual players in that coalition.    
2.1.1 COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY CONCEPTS 
This section provides a general overview of the concepts employed in cooperative 
game theory.  Further details and necessary equations for performing cooperative game 
theory calculations are provided in the Chapter 3. 
Generally, cooperative games are multi-player games where any number (n) of 
players, n > 1, may be involved in the game.  Players in a game represent stakeholders or 
decision makers in a resource allocation problem.  In the case of water resources, players 
may include, but are not limited to, countries, states, or individual water users such as 
municipalities, irrigators, or industries.  In cooperative game theory, communication 
takes place between the players prior to the game and players are allowed to make joint 
and binding agreements called “coalitions.” In any n-player game there are 2n-1 possible 
coalitions which may form.  The coalitions range from non-cooperative coalitions to full 
cooperative coalitions (the grand coalition) and subsets of players (partial coalitions) that 
may also form coalitions.   
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Typically, cooperative games are expressed in “characteristic form,” meaning that 
the outcomes of all possible strategies are expressed in terms of a characteristic function. 
Denoted as v, the characteristic function is used to represent the benefits of cooperation to 
each coalition.  Characteristic function values for a water resources cooperative game are 
often calculated using a water resources model, as will be discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
Given the characteristic function of a cooperative game, various allocation 
methods can be utilized to distribute the total benefits of each coalition to its players.  
Benefits from cooperation in water resources management can be physical gains, such as 
hydroelectricity generation, or increased water quality or availability, or they may be 
economic gains, such as increased agricultural profit.  Players in a cooperative game are 
assumed to behave rationally and allocations are made with the constraint or assumption 
that no player in a coalition will accept an allocation that is less than they can gain by 
themselves without cooperation.  A commonly used method for determining the range of 
the possible allocations that players might agree to is the “Core.”  The Core is a set of 
allocations (solutions) that are not dominated by any other allocations; in other words, 
these are allocations that all players in a coalition are willing to accept (Gillies, 1953).  In 
game theory terms, these allocations are known as “imputations” and they satisfy three 
necessary conditions: 1) efficiency, which requires all of the value obtained by the 
coalition be distributed to its players; 2) individual rationality, where no player will 
accept an allocation that is less than they could gain by themselves without cooperation; 
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and 3) Pareto optimality, which ensures that the individual allocations sum to the value of 
the coalition (Gillies, 1953). 
The Core provides bounds on the minimum and maximum benefit that each 
player is likely to gain from cooperation (Gilles, 1953).  The bounds for the Core are 
derived from the characteristic function values for each coalition.  The larger the Core is, 
the larger the negotiating space is.  If the Core does not exist, there are methods for 
expanding the Core to search for other solutions.  If the Core exists, various allocation 
methods can be employed, such as the Shapley value, to determine effective allocations 
among the players.   
If the Core exists, the Shapley (Shapley, 1953) and the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 
1969) allocations can be used to fairly and equitably distribute the gains of a coalition to 
its players.  In general terms, the Shapley allocation is the average marginal contribution 
of each player to a coalition, or each player’s benefit added through cooperation in a 
coalition.  The Nucleolus is the lexicographic minimum of excesses in the allocations 
where an excess is defined as the difference between the minimum allocation and the 
assigned allocation.  The Nucleolus minimizes these excesses to all players. 
Stability indices are a useful tool for ensuring that players are satisfied with 
allocations from a coalition.  Once allocations of coalition gains have been determined 
for each player in a coalition, stability indices may be calculated to determine the extent 
to which allocations from the Core satisfy the coalition members.  The Gately Propensity 
to Disrupt (Gately, 1974) is a useful method for calculating the stability of a solution.  
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2.1.2 GAME THEORY IN WATER RESOURCES 
Cooperative game theory has been successfully applied in numerous areas of 
resource management such as fisheries, forest management and pollution control.  Zara et 
al. (2006) provide a thorough review of cooperative game theory applications to natural 
and environmental resources problems other than water resources.  This review will focus 
on cooperative game theory applications with respect to water resources management. 
Cooperative game theory applications in water resources management can be categorized 
as either classical or non-classical.  Classical games require users to specify all possible 
sequences of strategies prior to play, while non-classical games allow strategies to 
develop through repeated play (Sage and Rouse, 1999).  This section provides an 
overview of both classical and non-classical cooperative game theory applications to 
water resources management. 
2.1.2.1 Non-Classical Game Theory in Water Resources 
There is a developing field of non-classical game theory with applications to 
conflict analysis in water resources management.  These non-classical games include 
metagame analysis (Hipel et al., 1976; Howard, 1971), hypergames (Okada et al., 1985) 
and graph models (Nandalal and Hipel, 2007; Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 1997). These 
games allow strategies to evolve over time through repeated play, and the players 
typically do not have communication prior to play.  The relative preferences of each 
player must be specified prior to the game.  Through repeated play, a player’s responses 
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to other players’ decisions are tested and strategies for resource allocation that minimize 
conflict are created over time (Nandalal and Hipel, 2007). 
While metagames and graph models have proven to be useful tools for conflict 
analysis in water resources applications, they require repeated play to allow strategies to 
evolve over time.  Rather than using a method to minimize conflict, the intent of this 
research is to create games where players cooperate and learn the benefits of that 
cooperation.  The games in this research give players the opportunity to negotiate and 
divide the benefits of their cooperation.  Since the methods described in this section do 
not rely on cooperation through coalition building they will not be considered further 
here.  
2.1.2.2 Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources 
Cooperative game theory has been utilized for decision making in multiple areas 
of water resources management.  Rogers (1969) presented one of the first applications of 
game theory to water resources management found in the literature.  The author 
demonstrated that game theory can provide a basis for analyzing treaty negotiation 
between India and the province of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) for their shared water 
resources of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.  Since that application, cooperative 
game theory has been applied to various water management topics such as cost allocation 
for water development projects, water quality, aquifer management and transboundary 
water resources management.  This section contains brief descriptions of game theory 
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applications to water resources.  Section 2.3 deals specifically with transboundary water 
resources management. 
Cooperative game theory has been demonstrated to be a useful tool for fairly 
allocating the cost of shared water resources projects to the water consumers.  Suzuki and 
Nakayama (1976) illustrated the allocation of costs and benefits of a water development 
project (i.e. dam construction) to both agricultural and municipal users.  This idea of 
allocating costs and benefits to multiple users was echoed by Straffin and Heaney (1981) 
where costs were equitably allocated between different Tennessee Valley Authority 
projects (hydropower, flood management and navigation). 
A common application of cooperative game theory has been cost sharing for 
regional wastewater treatment.  Many authors have compared the costs and benefits of 
individual users treating their wastewater as opposed to using a regional treatment facility 
(Giglio and Wrightington, 1972; Heaney and Dickinson, 1982; Loehman et al., 1979).   
Along the same lines as regional wastewater treatment, Young et al. (1982) used 
cooperative game theory to show that a regional water supply was more beneficial to the 
stakeholders for a case study in Sweden.  Adding onto the idea of cost sharing for 
regional water projects, Dinar et al. (1986) and Dinar and Yaron (1986) included reuse of 
municipal water for irrigation to the analysis of regional wastewater treatment.  This 
extended the cooperative game to multi-user games with municipal and agricultural users.   
Cost sharing games have also been applied in the area of water quality.  Dinar and 
Howitt (1997) utilized cost allocation games to minimize pollution, allocating the costs of 
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regional treatment of irrigation drainage.  Rather than allocating the costs and benefits of 
treatment, Kilgour et al. (1988) allocated allowable pollutant discharge.  The water 
quality standard and the total allowable concentration of chemical oxygen demand 
(COD) discharge were determined.  The allowable COD discharge was allocated among 
the dischargers, demonstrating how loadings can be reduced efficiently by sharing the 
effort with all dischargers.  
 Cooperative game theory has been applied to a variety of water resources 
allocation projects.  As discussed above, the literature shows that cooperative game 
theory is a useful tool for allocating the costs and benefits of regional projects but little 
work has been done in the area of transboundary river basins.  The next section outlines 
the relevant literature for cooperative game theory in transboundary river basins. 
 
2.2 Cooperative Game Theory in Transboundary River Basins  
The previous section discussed how cooperative game theory has been utilized to 
analyze various water resources problems.  However, limited work has been done on 
applying cooperative game theory to transboundary water sources and river basins. 
Cooperative game theory has been utilized to allocate quantities of water from a shared 
water source.  In a sequence of papers, Becker and Easter (1997 and 1999) applied 
cooperative game theory to water allocation from the Great Lakes.  The authors 
demonstrated that a cooperative solution for equitable water sharing could be calculated 
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for the transboundary lakes.  An interesting point highlighted by the authors is that once 
partial coalitions were formed and fair allocations were made, the non-cooperative 
coalitions could be induced to cooperate.  The Grand Coalition was shown to be the best 
solution for all players.  Although these applications deal with a transboundary water 
sources, this section focuses specifically on transboundary river basins.  
 Cooperative game theory has been successfully applied to the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra basin (Rogers, 1969; Rogers, 1993), the Nile basin (Wu, 2000; Wu and 
Whittington, 2006), and the Euphrates and Tigris (Kucukmehmetoglu, 2002; 
Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004) rivers.  In addition, game theory has been 
applied for water trading from the Nile among the Middle East countries of Egypt and 
Israel, and with the regions of the Gaza Strip and the West bank (Dinar and Wolf, 1994).  
This section outlines the water planning models, the coalitions considered, and the 
political structures included in these transboundary river basin cooperative games. 
2.2.1 WATER PLANNING MODELS   
All of the transboundary river basin cooperative games discussed in this section 
used optimization models to calculate the characteristic functions of their games.   
Nonlinear Programming was applied in the Nile game (Wu, 2000; Wu and Whittington, 
2006), which maximized the net economic benefit to each player and considered physical 
basin constraints.  The Ganges-Brahmaputra (Rogers, 1969; Rogers, 1993), Euphrates-
Tigris games (Kucukmehmetoglu, 2002; Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004; 
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Kucukmehmetoglu, 2009), and the Mid-East water trading game (Dinar and Wolf, 1994) 
utilized Linear Programming.  In the case of the Ganges-Brahmatputra and Euphrates-
Tigris games, the objective was to maximize the net benefit to each player in terms of 
monetary value constrained by the physical system. The monetary value in these models 
was derived from hydropower production and irrigation uses.  Rogers (1969), Wu (2000), 
and Kucukmehmetoglu (2002) concluded that their water resources models were proof-
of-concept models, rather than detailed and accurate simulations, due to lack of data for 
the respective basins.  Their models did not accurately represent their river basins and 
better data is required to improve their games. 
Dinar and Wolf (1994) utilized a simple linear optimization model that 
maximized water deliveries to players in a water market subject to price and water 
quantity constraints.  This model used a simplified Nile basin representation focusing on 
the economics of the game rather than the physical characteristics of the system.  
Including more detailed modeling into their game would improve the reliability of their 
water availability in their water trading calculations. 
2.2.2 COALITIONS 
Typically, when cooperative game theory has been applied to a transboundary 
river basin, the players have been the basin riparian countries.  There does not seem to be 
an example in the literature where the players in a transboundary river game are 
individual users within the countries.  Rogers (1969) considered a two-player game 
23 
 
between India and Pakistan.  In his second application (1993), a new game was 
considered and expanded to include the three players of India, Bangladesh, and Nepal.  
Inclusion of the third player added to the richness of the problem and more accurately 
represented the basin.  In the case of the Nile game, four players were considered (Egypt, 
Sudan, Ethiopia and, represented as a single player, the equatorial states of Uganda, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo.  As players are 
added, the number of imputations (2n-1 for n players) and the complexity of the problem 
increases significantly, but the richness of the solution also increases. 
2.2.3 POLITICS 
Politics have rarely been considered in cooperative transboundary games.  The only 
game that includes politics is the Mid-East water trading game (Dinar and Wolf, 1994).  
Dinar and Wolf (1994) utilized a method called the Political Accounting System (PAS), 
which takes account of how the players would behave under their respective countries’ 
political constraints. These political constraints include existing treaties, agreements, and 
political behavior.  The PAS is a methodology to create utility for games based on each 
player’s political attitudes.  Based on the player’s political attitudes, the PAS calculates 
the likelihood of coalition formation.  This research will not utilize PAS for incorporating 
political behavior, but bi-national policies are included in the Physical Assessment 
model.  The bi-national agreements of 1906 and 1944 are included as constraints and all 




A review of the literature shows that cooperative game theory has been used 
successfully to estimate the potential benefits of cooperation among riparian countries in 
transboundary river basins.  Cooperative game theory also provides tools to fairly and 
equitably allocate the gains of cooperation to the players.  The literature shows that the 
transboundary river games have been somewhat limited, i.e., games among countries, 
rather than individual users.  This research aims to demonstrate cooperative game theory 
applied to individual users in a transboundary system as players rather than just the 
riparian countries.  Creating a game in this manner distributes the benefits in a more 
detailed manner to individual users rather than to the countries. 
The literature has shown that the water planning models utilized in transboundary 
cooperative games tend to be oversimplified or lack accurate data.  Additionally there has 
been little inclusion of policies into transboundary cooperative games.  This research 
develops a comprehensive and reasonably accurate model that follows the constraints of 
existing water uses, management and international treaties.  A detailed water planning 
model coupled with cooperative game theory concepts provides stakeholders in the Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin with a powerful tool for quantifying the benefits of cooperating to 






This section outlines the methods used to meet the objectives of this research.  
Cooperative games are developed based on stakeholder defined water management 
scenarios.  Players in the games are selected based on the water management scenarios 
and the characteristic function values for those players are calculated.  To calculate the 
characteristic function values, a water management model is developed to simulate the 
physical outcomes of the water management scenarios. The outcome of a game is a 
quantification of the benefits of player cooperation and the opportunity for players to 
negotiate and divide the benefits of their cooperation.  
An n-person cooperative game is applied to the Rio Grande/Bravo basin case study 
area.  The games are developed from the Physical Assessment Project scenarios that have 
been shown to have physical feasibility after screening with the water resources planning 
model. This application will be discussed in detail in Section 4.  In general, the steps for 
the cooperative game analysis in a transboundary river basin include: 
1. Determine the players in the game 
2. Determine coalitions which may form for a selected scenario 
3. Calculate the characteristic functions for each coalition using the results from 
the water management model 
4. Determine the existence of the Core 
5. Apply a method to allocate the gains of the coalition to the individual players 
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6. Calculate the stability of the solution 
The Appendix contains an example of an application of cooperative game theory to 
a four player cooperative game in the transboundary Syr Darya basin in Central Asia. 
3.1 Players and Coalitions 
Players in the Rio Grande/Bravo cooperative game may represent, but are not 
limited to; countries (2), states (5 Mexican and 2 U.S.), irrigation districts, or smaller 
stakeholders such as irrigators, reservoir operators or municipalities.  Different sets of 
players are selected for various water management scenarios.  Once the n players are 
chosen, then 2n-1 possible coalitions can be formed.  Coalitions will range from an 
individual player acting alone (non-cooperative or status quo), to a coalition of all players 
(full cooperation or the Grand Coalition).  Partial coalitions among subsets of players 
may also be considered. 
After selecting the players and determining the coalitions for a particular scenario, 
the characteristic function is calculated for each coalition using a water resources 
planning model. The simulation model for the Rio Grande/Bravo case study is described 
in detail in Section 4. The planning model is run for each coalition ranging from non-
cooperative to full cooperation and the resulting benefits are assigned to the players.  
Benefits can be based on water volumes or economic values, e.g., current water market 
information.  From these benefits and the results of the model, the characteristic functions 
for each coalition are calculated and used to determine the Core. 
27 
 
3.2 The Core 
The Core is a set of non-dominated allocations of gains from cooperation to the 
players.  The individual allocations are known as imputations (Schmeidler 1969) denoted 
as Ωj for player j.  In other words; the Core is a set of feasible allocations that all players 
would be willing to accept and are larger than the allocation they would get if they didn’t 
cooperate.  Imputations from the Core satisfy individual and collective rationality (Pareto 
Optimality) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).   
Individual rationality, the concept that no player will accept an allocation smaller 
than what they can receive without cooperation, can be expressed as: 
  Njjvj      Equation 3-1 
where:  
Ωj = an allocation to player j from the Core 
v(j) = the non-cooperative characteristic function value of player j  
N = the set of players in the game 
 
 Collective rationality states that the gains obtained from forming the Grand 











 v(N) = the characteristic function of the Grand Coalition 
 
3.3 Allocation Methods  
 
Once the values of cooperating in various coalitions are known, the players must 
agree on a division of any gains over and above what can be gained through independent 
(non-cooperative) action.  Several allocation schemes have been proposed in the literature 
and are discussed here.   
Shapley (1953) proposed distributing the gains of a coalition to individual players 
based on their marginal contribution of benefits to the coalition.  The Shapley value for 
player j in a coalition is based on the player entering into an already forming Grand 
Coalition.  Player j’s marginal contribution or benefits received, for coalition formation is 
calculated based on this entry into the coalition as:  
 







1     Equation 3-3 
where: 
j  = Shapley value for player j 
n = total number of players in the game 
s = number of players in coalition S 
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 S = coalition S which contains j 
 v(S) = characteristic function for coalition S 
 v(S- j)  = characteristic function for coalition S without player j 
 
This equation considers all coalitions that may form containing player j.  All orderings of 






.  For calculations, as player j coalition S, created by the players which 
joined before, that player is awarded the marginal contribution (or additional benefit) of 
    jSvSv  .     
An alternative to the Shapley allocation is the Nucleolus, a single point allocation 
solution that always exists in a non-empty core (Schmeidler, 1969).  A Shapley allocation 
may not always occur in the Core, but the Nucleolus is guaranteed to occur in the Core.  
The Nucleolus is calculated by finding a vector of imputations Ω = ( Ω1 , Ω2, …, Ωn) that 
minimizes the maximum of excesses, e(Ω, S), over all coalitions S subject to 
   Nvj , where Ωj is an allocation to player j, and all allocations, Ωj, must sum to 
the characteristic value of the Grand Coalition.  The Nucleolus can be calculated as a 
linear programming problem (Straffin, 1993). 
The Shapley allocation is calculated from a player’s contribution to a coalition, 
while the Nucleolus aims to minimize dissatisfaction (excesses) of players by increasing 
their allocations.  Wu (2000) and Wu and Wittington (2006) noted that the Nucleolus is 
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always contained in the Core (if one exists) and ensures that the allocation satisfies 
collective and individual rationality.  Additionally, the Nucleolus in effect ‘levels the 
playing field’ meaning that it is not based on a player’s contribution to a coalition and 
gives them the opportunity to minimize their dissatisfaction (i.e. increase their 
allocation). 
3.4 Coalition Stability 
The likelihood that a player will leave the Grand Coalition because they are 
dissatisfied with their allocation, say from the Shapley or Nucleolus method, can be 
quantified through “stability indices.” One method to measure this dissatisfaction with an 
allocation is the Gately “propensity to disrupt” which is described in this section.    
The “propensity to disrupt” (dj) of player j is calculated as (Gately, 1974): 
 
                                   Equation 3-4  
where: 





i  = the sum of the allocation to all players i ≠ j 
 v(j) = characteristic function for a non-cooperative player j 














 The propensity to disrupt is measured for a player j relative to the other players in 
a coalition.  The propensity to disrupt is the ratio of what the players in coalition {N – j} 
stand to lose if player j leaves the Grand Coalition {N}, to what the player j would lose 
by leaving the Grand Coalition.  If dj is positive and larger than a specified value, player j 
will tend to disrupt the Grand Coalition unless their allocation is increased.  This value is 
set by the game’s players.  For example, if a player’s propensity to disrupt were 100, then 
if the player left the grand coalition they would cause a loss 100 times greater to the 
remaining coalition members than to themselves.  However, if their propensity to disrupt 
is 1, then they cause the same loss to themselves as to the remaining coalition members. 
The propensity to disrupt is used to eliminate imputations in the Core for which a 







This dissertation has described in general terms the methods which may be 
utilized in the application of cooperative game theory to transboundary river basins.  This 
section describes the specific application of the cooperative game theory methods to the 
Rio Grande/Bravo case study.  Included in this section is the description of the 
comprehensive water planning model and its validation process as well as the 
development of a water management scenario into a cooperative game framework.  
Results from this application are described in Chapter 5.  In addition to the Rio 
Grande/Bravo application, an application of a 4 player cooperative game in the Syr Darya 
in Central Asia is described in the Appendix.   
4.1 Water Resources Planning Model 
A water resource planning model was created for the Rio Grande/Bravo basin 
using river basin simulation software.  An optimization model was not chosen as the 
planning model for the Rio Grande/Bravo cooperative game because formulation of a 
single objective function for this large basin would prove difficult and may be unrealistic.  
The water resources planning model for the Rio Grande/Bravo basin has been constructed 
in the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) system (www.weap21.org, Danner et al., 
2006).  WEAP is a flexible river basin simulation software which utilizes a user-friendly 
graphical interface to construct the model schematically, enter data, allocate water to 
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users, and view results.  WEAP is a demand driven allocation model operating on basic 
principles of water balance accounting, linking water supplies from rivers, reservoirs, and 
aquifers with prioritized water demands in an integrated system. 
The Rio Grande/Bravo WEAP model includes the main stem of the river from 
Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico to the Gulf of Mexico. A hydrologic break 
occurs in the main stem of the Rio Grande/Bravo in a reach commonly known as the 
“Forgotten River.”  This reach, located just below Fort Quitman, Texas to above the 
confluence with the Rio Conchos, often has little or no streamflow (Teasley and 
McKinney, 2005).  Due to this hydrologic break, water management decisions made 
upstream from Elephant Butte to El Paso/Ciudad Juarez have little effect on the river 
from the confluence with the Rio Conchos to the Gulf of Mexico.    
Numerous tributaries in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin are included in the WEAP 
model.  The main tributaries in the U.S. include the Pecos and Devils rivers, Goodenough 
Spring, and Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe and Pinto Creeks.  The main tributaries on the 
Mexican side include the Rio Conchos and its tributaries, Rios San Diego, San Rodrigo, 
Escondido, Salado, San Juan, Alamo and Las Vacas (Danner et al., 2006).  
4.1.1 HYDROLOGIC DATA 
The information to support the Rio Grande/Bravo model was derived from 
numerous sources.  Most of the data were obtained from a relational Arc Hydro 
geodatabase created for the Rio Grande/Bravo basin (Patiño-Gomez and McKinney, 
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2005).  The Rio Grande/Bravo geodatabase contains geographic, hydrologic, hydraulic, 
water demand and related data for the entire basin. The geodatabase was created through 
the cooperation of the Center for Research in Water Resources (CRWR) at The 
University of Texas at Austin, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), 
the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), and the National Water Commission 
(CNA) of Mexico (Patiño-Gomez et al., 2007).   
In addition to the data from the geodatabase, the Rio Grande/Bravo model utilizes 
naturalized flow and channel loss data from the TCEQ Water Availability Modeling 
(WAM) project (TCEQ, 2005).  Naturalized flows are calculated to represent the natural 
streamflow in a river in the absence of human development and water use.  A series of 
monthly naturalized flows were calculated for a sixty year period (1940-2000) for the Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin from El Paso to the Gulf of Mexico and all the major tributaries 
including the Pecos River and the Rio Conchos (Brandes, 2003).  As part of these 
calculations, channel losses were determined, including channel seepage, evaporation, 
and evapotranspiration. 
In the Rio Grande/Bravo model, naturalized flows are used as input for headflows 
for 21 rivers and creeks and incremental flows for 22 sites in the basin to represent 
unaccounted gains along stream reaches (Danner et al., 2006).  In addition to surface 
water, groundwater is included in the model as a source of water supply for both 
countries. Data related to groundwater storage capacity, initial storage, maximum 
withdrawal, and natural recharge are included in the model. 
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4.1.2 WATER DEMANDS 
There are 178 water demands (demand sites) included in the Rio Grande/Bravo 
model, including municipalities, irrigation, mining, industrial, and other uses.  Due to the 
large number of individual water users in the basin (over 1,600 in Texas alone) many of 
the demands were aggregated into larger demand sites in the model.  Demands for these 
water users were combined based on type of demand, location in the basin, and legal 
jurisdiction.  Table 4-1 is a summary of the number and type of surface water demand 
sites for each country.  In addition to surface water demands shown in Table 4-1, there 
are 22 Mexican demand sites with a total water demand of 1,655 million cubic meters 
(MCM) satisfied by groundwater deliveries and 21 U.S. demand  sites which can draw a 
maximum of 2,840 MCM of groundwater. 
 
Table 4-1 Surface Water Demand Type, Number, and Demand Volume (MCM) for 
Demand Nodes by Country in the Rio Grande/Bravo WEAP Model 
Demand 
Type 













Municipal 15 564 23 283 
Irrigation 27 3,798 55 2,153 
Other 0 0 15 11 
Total 42 4,362 93 2,447 
 
In the monthly time-step model, allocation of water to demands each month is 
based on user-defined priorities. First, the model delivers water to all priority one users 
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and then any remaining water in the system is allocated to priority two users, and so on.  
This type of priority allocation allows the model to mimic the actual water allocation 
policies in the basin.  For example, in both Texas and Mexico, municipal demands 
always have priority over any other use in the basin.  When water is scarce in the basin, 
priority allocation ensures that water is delivered to municipal demands before any other 
use, such as irrigation or industry. 
4.1.3 RESERVOIR CAPACITY 
The model contains 25 reservoirs (Figure 4-1) with a total storage capacity of 
22,034 MCM.  Two international reservoirs in the basin, Falcon and La Amistad, are 
owned and operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico and have a combined capacity of 
7,177 MCM.  Fourteen reservoirs in the basin are owned by Mexico with a total storage 
capacity of 11,424 MCM.  Five reservoirs in the model are owned by the U.S. and have a 
total storage of 3,433 MCM.  In the model, each reservoir has a number of storage zones 








4.1.4 LEGAL INSTITUTIONS REPRESENTED IN THE WATER PLANNING MODEL 
WEAP has a scripting language that allows the user to create rules for a basin 
such as operation rules for reservoirs or allocation rules for treaties.  The Rio 
Grande/Bravo model uses this scripting capability to represent the legal framework of 
water allocation in the basin.  The model includes relevant policies from the 1906 
Convention (IBWC, 1906) and the 1944 Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico (IBWC, 
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1944), the Interstate Compacts for the Rio Grande (Colorado, New Mexico and Texas) 
(USBR, 1939), and the Texas Watermaster rules for Texas water rights (TCEQ, 2008).   
 An example of using scripts in WEAP is the tracking of water allocations under 
the 1944 Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico. Section 2.1.1 of the 1944 Treaty outlines 
the apportionment of Rio Grande/Bravo flows below Fort Quitman, Texas.   The model 
has scripts which track the volume of water delivered to the U.S. from the Mexican 
tributaries averaged over a five-year period.  Scripts are also used to track the ownership 
of the water stored in the international reservoirs, Amistad and Falcon (Danner et al., 
2006).  The volumes for each country are tracked as accounts and releases to downstream 
demands are deducted from the appropriate account.  These accounts are used to limit 
downstream demands based on the amount of water available in storage for each country. 
4.1.5 MODEL TESTING 
Model testing was completed in two stages. The first stage was calibration, where 
parameters in the model were adjusted so that the model results were closer to the 
historical conditions in the basin.  The second stage in the testing process was model 
validation, where historic conditions were entered into the model to determine if the 
model was capturing historical operations within the basins.  Both stages of model testing 




4.1.5.1 Model Calibration 
To calibrate the Rio Grande/Bravo model, reservoir conservation storage in all 25 
reservoirs in the model and stream channel conveyance losses were adjusted to try to 
achieve agreement between model and historic values for several variables.  These 
parameters were chosen for the calibration process because additional information was 
available for them.  Other parameters in the model could be adjusted for better 
calibration, but without additional information it is difficult to know if the adjustments 
are reasonable or grounded in reality.   
The first parameter adjusted in the calibration process was reservoir conservation 
storage.  Examination of historical storage levels in Mexican reservoirs revealed that 
water was often stored in the region above the declared (‘official’) conservation storage 
zone.  To compensate for this and to capture the historical reservoir behavior, the 
conservation zones in those reservoirs were adjusted and the resulting storage levels were 
compared to the historical levels.   
Next, stream channel conveyance losses were adjusted. Documentation exists 
which define two different sets of losses for the several of the same stream reaches in the 
basin; one set from the TCEQ WAM model (Brandes, 2003) and a second set from the 
Mexican National Water Commission, Comision Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA) 
(Collado 2002; Aldama 2008).  Calibration of the model with the two sets of parameters 
and combinations of them revealed that using a combination of parameters provides the 
best representation of historical conditions in the basin.  For the rivers and streams in the 
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U.S., the TCEQ conveyance losses provide the best results compared to the historical 
values, while the CONAGUA losses provide better results for the Mexican streams and 
rivers.  For the main stem of the Rio Grande/Bravo, the TCEQ conveyance losses were 
used.  Details of this process are found in Sandoval-Solis et al. (2008). 
4.1.5.2 Model Validation 
Model validation was performed by entering known historic water demands into 
the model, running the model for a 15-year period extending from 1978 to 1992, and 
comparing results.  This period was used because most of the water demands are known 
for this period and all of the reservoirs in the system were constructed and operational 
during that time period.  The modeled storage values in the U.S. and Mexican accounts in 
both international reservoirs were compared to the historical storage values (see Figures 
4-2 and 4-3).  International reservoir storage was chosen as a performance measure for 
the model because these reservoirs are located in the lower part of the basin and are 
highly affected by operations in the upper part of the basin, as well as, demands in the 






Figure 4-2 Historic vs. Modeled Reservoir Storage for the Mexican Accounts in the 
International Reservoirs 
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By inspection of the graphs, the modeled storage values follow the same trends as 
the historic values for both the Mexican (Figure 4-2) and the U.S. (Figure 4-3) accounts.  
The difference between the historic and modeled values for the 15-year period is 3.6% 
for the Mexican accounts and 4.3% for the U.S. accounts.  The modeled storage values 
tend to be slightly higher than the historic storage values.  The validation results 
demonstrate that the Rio Grande/Bravo model provides a reasonable representation of the 
water management in the basin. 
4.2 Water Demand Reduction Game 
The Water Demand Reduction game utilizes a scenario based on a water rights 
buy-back program implemented in the Rio Conchos basin in Mexico.  In 2003, Mexico 
began a program to purchase (buy-back) existing water rights from Rio Conchos 
irrigation districts.  This program, named PADUA (Programa de Adecuación de 
Derechos de Uso del Agua y Redimensionamiento de Distritos de Riego) was developed 
to reduce water allocations with the intention to buy back water rights that were unlikely 
to be met in drought periods (SAGARPA-FAO, 2005).  The program purchased 
groundwater and surface water rights from the Delicias Irrigation District (DR005) and 
surface water rights from the Bajo Conchos Irrigation District (DR090).  The Water 
Demand Reduction game examines water rights buybacks only in District 005 and is 
based on an increase in the water buy-back volumes above those originally proposed by 
the PADUA program.  
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Under the PADUA program, the water concessions to District 005 were reduced 
from 1,130.6 million cubic meters per year (MCM/year) by buying-back surface and 
groundwater rights.   In the Water Demand Reduction game, District 005 agrees to sell 
surface and groundwater rights to reduce their water demand from 1,130.6 MCM/year to 
a lower volume of 628.1 MCM/year (Table 4-2) (SAGARPA-FAO, 2005). PADUA 
proposed to split the buy back with 83% being surface water rights and 17% being 
groundwater rights.  The Water Demand Reduction game uses these same percentages of 
surface water and groundwater buybacks (Table 4-2).  Although buying back surface 
water rights would leave more surface water available to downstream users, groundwater 
is an important resource for District 005.  The Meoqui aquifer is naturally recharged 
through infiltration from the surface agricultural water application. Reducing the demand 
for groundwater from the Meoqui aquifer helps to protect against over-pumping of 
groundwater. Details of the modeling for this scenario can be found in Sandoval-Solis et 
al. (2008), but the volumes of the buy-backs have been increased and correspond to the 
values shown in Table 4-2.  
 
Table 4-2 Water Rights Reduction in District 005 in the Rio Conchos for the Water 
Reduction Game 
Water  Source 







Surface 941 523 418 
Groundwater 190 105 83.9 





The players for the Water Demand Reduction game are the three largest irrigation 
water users in the basin.  The first player is the Delicias Irrigation District 005 in the Rio 
Conchos. The second player is the Mexican Irrigation District 025, in the lower Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin.  Finally, the third player, represented as a single player, is an 
aggregate of the largest irrigation districts in Texas below Falcon Reservoir (Watermaster 
Section 10), also in the lower basin. The approximate locations of the three players are 
shown in Figure 4-4.   
District 005 was selected as a player since the management changes proposed 
under this scenario would be implemented there. The other players were selected because 
they have the largest water demands in the basin and are the most affected by the water 
management scenarios.  Municipalities in the basin also have large demands, but not as 





Figure 4-4 Location of the Three Players in the Cooperative Games for the Rio 
Grande/Bravo Basin 
  
4.2.2 COALITION DESCRIPTIONS 
The players in the Water Demand Reduction game may form a total of seven 
coalitions that range from individual or non-cooperative coalitions, to fully cooperative 
coalitions.  In non-cooperative coalitions, the players act individually to maximize their 
benefits.  In fully cooperative coalitions, all players act together to maximize their 
collective benefits, beyond what they could achieve acting individually.   Players may 
also form partial coalitions consisting of subsets of players.  Each possible coalition and 
the presumed actions taken by those coalitions are described below. 
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Coalition {1}  This coalition represents Player 1, Irrigation District 005, acting 
alone.  Irrigation District 005 has a total annual water demand of 1,131 MCM.  Under 
this coalition, District 005 ensures their own delivery of water to satisfy their total 
demand.   
 
Coalition {2}  This non-cooperative coalition represents Player 2, Irrigation 
District 025, acting alone.  Irrigation District 025 has an annual water demand of 1,127 
MCM which is met through withdrawals from the Rio Grande/Bravo.  In this coalition, 
Irrigation District 025 does not finance water buybacks in the Rio Conchos and attempts 
to meet their water demand with the available water.   
 
Coalition {3}  This coalition characterizes Player 3, Watermaster Section 10 
(below Falcon reservoir), acting alone.  Watermaster Section 10 is represented as a single 
player with an annual water demand of 647 MCM which is satisfied through withdrawals 
from the Rio Grande. Under this coalition, this player does not finance water buybacks in 
the Rio Conchos and attempts to meet their water demands with the water available in the 
Rio Grande.  
  
Coalition {1, 2}  District 005 and District 025 work cooperatively under this partial 
coalition.  District 025 provides the investment to purchase 502 MCM of combined 
surface and groundwater water rights in District 005 (see Table 4-2), reducing District 
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005’s demand for water.  Due to physical losses in the system, as the water travels 
downstream, only about 20% of the water released from District 005 reaches the lower 
basin (Sandoval et al., 2008).  Additionally, according to the 1944 Treaty, any water from 
the Rio Conchos reaching the Rio Grande is divided 1/3 to the U.S. and 2/3 to Mexico 
(IBWC, 1944).  418 MCM of surface water rights are purchased from District 005. 
District 025 is entitled to 56 MCM because of the system losses and treaty division.  Only 
the surface water rights are available to the downstream players because there is no plan 
to pump the groundwater into the river. 
 
Coalition {1, 3} District 005 and Watermaster Section 10 work cooperatively, with 
Watermaster Section 10 providing investment to purchase 502 MCM of surface and 
ground water rights, thus reducing District 005’s overall demand for water (see Table 4-
1).  Due to physical losses and treaty obligations described above, Watermaster Section 
10 is entitled to an additional 28 MCM/year of the 418 MCM of purchased surface water 
rights after accounting for the treaty division and the system losses.  The groundwater 
portion of the water buybacks is not available to the Watermaster Section 10 because 
there is no plan to pump the groundwater into the river. 
 
Coalition {2, 3} District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 cannot increase their 
benefits without including District 005.  The water buybacks occur strictly in District 
005.  Since they are not in this coalition, District 005 may continue to use water at their 
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non-cooperative rate, which leaves District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 with access 
to the same amount of water they receive under the non-cooperative solution. 
 
Coalition {1, 2, 3} In the Grand Coalition, District 005, District 025 and Watermaster 
Section 10 all work cooperatively.  Both District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 
provide the investment to purchase 502 MCM of water rights, thus reducing District 
005’s overall demand for water.  District 025 and Watermaster Section 10, are entitled to 
share the 418 MCM of surface water rights bought-back, 84 MCM/year after losses and 
treaty obligations. The downstream players do not have access to the groundwater rights 
bought-back because there is no plan to pump the groundwater and send it downstream, it 
remains in the aquifer. 
4.2.3 CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION UTILITY 
In cooperative game theory, a characteristic function is calculated to express the 
value of a coalition.  The characteristic function for the Water Demand Reduction game 
is based on the minimum delivery received by each of the game’s players.  The players 
are agricultural users who derive monetary benefit from water deliveries.  A critical value 
to an irrigator may be their minimum delivery, the smallest annual amount that they will 
receive in a planning period, which may constrain their agricultural production.   
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Minimum deliveries for each player are determined for a simulation period, N. 
The minimum delivery, , is defined for each player i for all time t over the period N 
as 
 
           Equation 4-1 
where: 
 N   the total number of years in the simulation 
    delivery to player i at time t, t = 1,…, N 
 
To calculate the characteristic functions for the coalitions, a value must be 
assigned to the water delivered to each coalition.  Water sharing in the Rio Grande/Bravo 
is governed by allocation rules in various treaties and water sharing agreements between 
the U.S. and Mexico.  The largest constraint on water sharing is the 1944 treaty in which 
the water flowing from the 6 tributaries in Mexico is divided 1/3 to the U.S. and 2/3 to 
Mexico once it reaches the main channel as described in Section 2.1.1 (IBWC, 1944).  
Due to this constraint, the volumes of water are not transferred between players 
proportionally.  Any unit of water released from the Rio Conchos is immediately divided 
at the confluence of the Rio Grande/Bravo with 1/3 to the U.S. and 2/3 to Mexico.   Due 
to this constraint, the cooperative games are created in monetary terms, rather than in 
volumes of water because money can be transferred proportionally among the players.  
Players negotiate for a share of the monetary benefits rather than for volumes of water.  
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In each simulation, each player receives a minimum water delivery, which is converted to 
a monetary value.  
Literature outlines a few economic studies of water in the Rio Grande/Bravo 
basin.   Characklis et al. (1999) and Scott et al. (2007) determined the price of water from 
data on water transferred from agricultural users to municipal users in the lower Rio 
Grande/Bravo and in the major tributary the Rio San Juan, respectively.  Characklis et al. 
(2006) developed a demand function based on water availability in upstream reservoirs 
and water right prices for U.S. irrigators in the lower Rio Grande/Bravo valley.  These 
values represent a user’s willingness to pay for an increment of water (Young, 2005).  
While these are reasonable values for the price of water, they do not account factors such 
as government subsidies, agricultural profits or production costs to create a total value of 
water. 
Monetary values for water delivered are based on previous economic analyses of 
the Rio Conchos basin (Gastélum, 2006 and Gastélum et al., 2009).   In both studies, the 
authors estimated crop prices using a 4 year average of the latest available data, taking 
into account production costs that include land preparation, planting, fertilizers, 
pesticides, irrigation, insurance and harvesting.   Profits from crops were determined as 
an average for the period of 1998-2001 and expressed in 2005 values as $63 million/year 
for all three irrigation districts in the Rio Conchos (Gastélum, 2006).  This average profit 
was related to the average delivery volume of 731.8 MCM/year for the same period to all 
three irrigation districts (CONAGUA, 2008).  The profit per unit of water delivered for 
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District 005 in the Rio Conchos is $86,000/MCM (U.S. dollars) and is set as the value of 
water for District 005 for the game analysis.   
Similar data on crop production for the lower basin irrigation districts was not 
available, so an assumption is made that the irrigation districts in the lower basin, District 
025 and Watermaster Section 10, value their water deliveries at the same rate as District 
005.  This is a reasonable assumption because the operating costs and agricultural profits 
are similar across the border (Personal Communication, Engineer Caballero, President, 
Unidad Conchos Water Users’ Association, May 2005).   For the Water Demand 
Reduction game, all of the players value water deliveries at $86,000/MCM. 
4.2.4 CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION CALCULATIONS 
This section describes how the characteristic functions are calculated for each 
coalition in the Water Reduction Game in the Rio Grande/Bravo.  The characteristic 
functions are the value of the coalition and are used in the game theory calculation 
described in Chapter 5.   
4.2.4.1 Non-Cooperative Coalitions 
{1}, {2} and {3} In each of these coalitions, each player, i = 1 to 3, receives a minimum 
delivery, min_Di (MCM), which they value at a rate of pD ($/MCM). The characteristic 




District 005-    pD*min_D1     Equation 4-2 
District 025 -    pD*min_D2    Equation 4-3 
Watermaster Section 10 - pD*min_D3    Equation 4-4 
4.2.4.2 Partial Coalitions  
{1, 2}  For the partial coalition of Districts 005 and 025, District 025 purchases water 
rights, V1,2 (MCM), from District 005 at a price, p1,2 ($/MCM). District 005 receives a 
modified minimum delivery volume, min_D1’ = min_D1-V1,2 (MCM). District 025 
receives a modified minimum delivery volume, min_D2’ (MCM).  The modified 
minimum delivery, min_D2’, is not equal to the non-cooperative minimum delivery plus 
the volume bought back or min_D2 + V1,2, due to the 1944 Treaty water division and the 
system losses described in Section 4.2.2.  The monetary values to Districts 005 and 025 
are calculated as 
District 005 -   pD*min_D1’ + p1,2* V1,2     Equation 4-5 
  District 025 -  pD*min_D2
’
 - p1,2* V1,2  Equation 4-6 
 
 
The characteristic value of this coalition, v(1,2) , is the sum of equations 4-5 and 4-6. 
 
{1, 3}  For the partial coalition of Districts 005 and Watermaster Section 10, 
Watermaster Section 10 purchase water rights, V1,3 (MCM), from District 005 at a price, 
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p1,3 ($/MCM), which may be different from p1,2. District 005 receives a modified average 
minimum volume, min_D1’ (MCM).  Watermaster Section 10 receives a modified 
minimum delivery of min_D3’ (MCM).  It should be noted that the modified delivery 
volume,  min_D3’, is not equal to the non-cooperative minimum delivery volume and the 
volume bought back from Player 1 (min_D3+V1,3) because of the large system losses and 
the 1944 Treaty division of water from the Rio Conchos to the U.S. and Mexico.  Thus, 
the monetary values to Districts 005 and Watermaster Section 10 are 
 
 District 005 -    pD*min_D1
’ + p1,3*V1,3    Equation 4-7 
 Watermaster Section 10 - pD*min_D3
’
 - p1,3*V1,3   Equation 4-8 
 
The characteristic value for this partial coalition, v(1,3) is the sum of equations 4-7 and 4-
8. 
 
{2, 3}  Under this partial coalition, District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 Districts 
cannot increase their benefits without inclusion of District 005.  The value to each player 
in this coalition is the same as the non-cooperative values.  
 
District 025 -    pD*min_D2                      Equation 4-9 




The characteristic function, v(2,3) is the sum of the non-cooperative equations 4-9 and 4-
10. 
4.2.4.3 Grand Coalition  
{1, 2, 3} All players cooperate under the Grand Coalition.  District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10 each finance part of the water right buy-back in DR005.  District 
025 receives a modified minimum delivery of min_D2’’ (MCM), and in turn, they 
compensate District 005 for a portion of the water buy-back volume, V1,2 (MCM).  
Watermaster Section 10 receives a modified minimum delivery of min_D3’’ (MCM) and 
compensates District 005 for a portion of the water rights bought back, V1,3 (MCM).  
District 005 receives compensation from both District 025 and the Watermaster Section 
10 and a modified minimum delivery of min_D1
’’. Thus, the monetary values to District 
005, District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 are 
 
District 005 -   pD*min_D1
” + p1,2*V1,2  + p1,3*V1,3                  Equation 4-11 
District 025 -  pD*min_D2
” - p1,2*V1,2                Equation 4-12 
Watermaster Section 10 - pD*min_D3
” - p1,3*V1,3            Equation 4-13 
 
The characteristic value of the Grand Coalition, v(1,2,3) is calculated as the sum of 
equations 4-11 through 4-13. 
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4.2.5 PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The water management scenarios considered here were developed to increase 
water availability to water users in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin (Sandoval et al., 2008).  
To determine if the Water Demand Reduction game improves water availability to each 
player, a set of performance metrics were calculated.   The average delivery,  , for 
player i in a period N, was calculated as 
    
∑
    Equation 4-14 
where: 
 
 N   the total number of simulation periods 
    delivery to player i at time t 
 
In addition to the average water delivery, performance measures are used to 
characterize the performance of a water management scenario.  The changes in water 
allocation caused by the water management decisions are evaluated using performance 
measures, which capture more of the distribution of the performance, in addition to the 
characteristic function values, which only captures the minimum or worst case, 
performance.   
For the Water Demand Reduction game the performance measures of 
Vulnerability, Resilience and Reliability were calculated to provide information about a 
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player’s severity of water shortages, the player’s ability to recover from water shortages 
and the reliability of water deliveries (Sandoval – Solis et al., 2008; Loucks and van Beek 
2005).   
A deficit,  , is defined as any delivery   to player i in any year t , that is less 





             Equation 4-15 
 
Reliability for player i is the probability that a deficit does not occur over the 
period of analysis (Klemes et al., 1981; Hashimoto et al., 1982; McMahon et al., 2006) 
 
  Equation 4-16 
where: 
  the number of zero deficit years for  player i for all years t in the 
simulation period 
 
Resilience, a measure of the rate of system recovery following a deficit period, is 
the probability that a year with no deficit occurs immediately after a year with a deficit 




#         
  Equation 4-17 
where: 
  the deficit occurring in year t to player i 
     the total number of deficits for player i over the simulation period 
 
Vulnerability, the expected value of the annual deficits, or the average deficit 
(Hashimoto et al., 1982), is calculated as a percent of player i’s total demand as follows 
(McMahon et al., 2006): 
 
∑
   Equation 4-18 
 
where: 





The cooperative game theory framework described in the previous chapters has 
been applied to a water management scenario for the transboundary Rio Grande/Bravo.  
The Water Demand Reduction game is calculated for a 60 year period.  To evaluate the 
effect of the compensation scheme in the Water Demand Reduction game, a new 
compensation scheme with outside funding was devised.  In addition to evaluating the 
compensation scheme, a period of drought was selected for comparison with the 60 year 
analysis period.  This drought analysis is done to determine the outcomes of the game (1) 
over a long-term simulation period, and (2) over a drought period.  The game is first 
calculated for the long-term 60 year period and is described in Section 5.1.  The second 
game with the compensation analysis is presented in Section 5.2, and finally, the drought 
analysis is described in Section 5.3.  
5.1 Long-Term Cooperative Game 
The water rights buy-back scenario described above is used for the non-
cooperative coalitions, representing the status-quo scenario. District 005’s water demand 
is set at 1,131 million cubic meters per year (MCM/year) for the non-cooperative 
coalitions. Watermaster Section 10’s demand is set 647 MCM/year, the value used in the 
TCEQ Water Availability Model (WAM) (TCEQ, 2005), representing the maximum for 
1989-2002 (Brandes, 2004).  The demand for District 025 is set at 1,127 MCM, the 
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median delivery over 1960 to 2004 (IBWC, 2009).  This district does not have a set water 
right and the delivery has been varied historically (Figure 4-3). The coalitions were 
simulated in the Rio Grande/Bravo model using naturalized inflow data for the 60-year 




Figure 5-1 Historical Deliveries and Median Delivery to Irrigation District 025 in the 
Lower Rio Grande/Bravo (IBWC, 2009) 
 
The characteristic functions and performance criteria were calculated for the 60-
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005, District 025, and Watermaster Section 10, is $86,000/MCM.  The value of 
compensation for water rights buy backs in District 005 from District 025, p1,2, and 
Watermaster Section 10, p1,3, is $86,000/MCM, assuming that District 005 would accept, 
as minimum compensation, the potentially lost revenue from the bought-back water 
rights.  The characteristic values for the game are described in detail in the following 
section. 
5.1.1 CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS 
 
{1}  In this coalition, District 005 receives an average of 88% of their demand.  The 
minimum delivery to this player is 74 MCM.  Given this minimum delivery, the value of 
this coalition is v(1) = $6.4 million/year (Table 5-1).  Under this non-cooperative 
coalition District 005 has a long-term average deficit or Vulnerability of 38%, a 
Reliability of 68%, and a Resilience of 32% (Table 5-2). 
 
{2}  Without cooperating, District 025 receives an average of 89% of their total annual 
demand and a minimum delivery of 400 MCM.  The value of this coalition is v(2) = 
$34.4 million/year based on their minimum delivery (Table 5-1).  District 025 has a 
Vulnerability of 30%, a Reliability of 63%, and a Resilience of 32% (Table 5-2). 
 
{3} Watermaster Section 10 receives an average of 95% of their annual demand and a 
minimum delivery of 356 MCM.  The value of this coalition is v(3) = $30.7 million/year 
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(Table 5-1).  Under the non-cooperative coalition, Watermaster Section 10 has a 
Vulnerability of 20%, Reliability of 75%, and a Resilience of 33% (Table 5-2). 
 
Table 5-1 Demands, Deliveries, and Characteristic Values for Non-Cooperative 
Coalitions {1}, {2}, {3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand MCM 1131 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 74 
Coalition Value $Million/year 6.4 
District 025 
Annual Demand MCM 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 400 
Coalition Value $Million/year 34.4 
Watermaster Section 10 
Annual Demand MCM 647 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 356 

















District 005 88 38 68 32 
District 025 89 30 63 32 
Watermaster Section 10  95 20 75 33 
 
{1, 2}  Under this coalition, District 005’s demand is reduced to 628 MCM and they 
receive, on average, 98% of their demand and have a minimum water delivery of 222 
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MCM/year (Table 5-3).  By reducing their overall demand for water, District 005 gets an 
increase in both their average annual deliveries and their minimum delivery.  Their 
minimum delivery is increased by 148 MCM/year or 10% (Figure 5-2).  The increase in 
minimum delivery may be due to the fact that, with a reduced water demand, the storage 
in both surface reservoirs and the groundwater are slightly increased, ensuring better 
deliveries over time.  This idea is reflected in the changes in the water performance 
measures. 
 District 005 has a considerable increase in the performance of their water 
deliveries.  In addition to the increased minimum delivery, District 005 has decreased 
their Vulnerability (long-term average deficit) by 2%, increased their Reliability by 25% 
and increased their Resilience by 43% (Table 5-2).  Each of these performance metrics 
demonstrates improvement in the delivery to District 005 under this coalition(Figure 5-2).   
By working cooperatively with District 005 under this coalition, District 025 
receives an improvement in their water deliveries.  District 025 receives an average of 
93% of their 1124 MCM annual demand and a minimum delivery of 519 MCM which is 
an increase of 119 MCM/year over their non-cooperative delivery (Figure 5-3)  This 
increased minimum delivery increases their water delivery value to $44.6 million (Table 
5-3).  Due to this cooperation, District 025 has increased both Reliability and Resilience 
by 14% (Figure 5-3).  The Vulnerability does not change, but there is an improvement in 
Resilience, so the system recovers more quickly from deficits than before.  The increase 
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in Reliability means that District 025 has a lower probability of deficits in the simulation 
period. 
The increases in District 025’s Reliability and Resilience indicate an improved 
performance in water deliveries (Figure 5-3).  The small changes in the performance 
measures is likely a result of the small delivery volumes from the water buy-backs, due to 
the system losses and the treaty division.   Under the 1944 Treaty, the water from the Rio 
Conchos is split with 1/3 to the U.S. and 2/3 to Mexico and of that volume only 20% 
reaches the lower basin due to the large system losses (see Section 4.2.2).  The value of 
this coalition is the sum of equations 4-5 and 4-6 and is v(1, 2) = $63.7 Million (Table 5-
3).   
Table 5-3 Demands, Deliveries, and Values for Coalition {1, 2} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 519 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 44.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 







Figure 5-2 Comparison of Performance Metrics for District 005 under the Partial 
Cooperative Coalition {1, 2} and their Non-Cooperative Coalition {1} 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Comparison of Performance Metrics for District 025 under the Partial 





























{1, 3}  In this partial coalition, District 005 and Watermaster Section 10 work 
cooperatively to increase their benefits beyond their non-cooperative values. District 
005’s demand is reduced to 628 MCM and they receive an average of 98% or their 
annual demand.  District 005 has an increased minimum delivery of 222 MCM.   The 
performance measures for District 005 are the same as under the coalition {1, 2} with a 
decrease in vulnerability and an increase in reliability and resilience indicating improved 
water deliveries (Figure 5-2).   
Watermaster Section 10 receives 97% of their annual demand and an increased 
minimum delivery of 393 MCM (Table 5-4).  District 005 is compensated $43.3 
million/year from Watermaster Section 10 for the water rights which are bought back 
(Table 5-4).  Under the non-cooperative coalition, Watermaster Section 10 was receiving 
a minimum delivery of 55% which is increased to 61% under this coalition.  Watermaster 
10 has less than 5% change in all performance measures (Figure 5-4), due to the limited 
increase in water deliveries under this coalition.  Although 502 MCM are bought-back 
from District 005, Watermaster Section 10 is only entitled to 28 MCM after the treaty 
division and the system losses.  Additionally, that 28 MCM is only delivered in years 
when there is sufficient water in the system to cover the other water demands in the 
basin.  The value of this coalition is the sum of Equations 4-7 and 4-8 and is expressed in 





Table 5-4 Demands, Deliveries, Values for Coalition {1, 3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation MCM 43.3 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  $Million/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM 393 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 33.8 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 





Figure 5-4 Comparison of Performance Metrics for Watermaster Section 10 under the 
















{2, 3}  District 025 and the Texas Irrigators cannot increase their benefits under this 
coalition.  The coalition value is equal to the sum of the non-cooperative solution 
(Equations 4-9 and 4-10), v(1, 3) = $65.1 million/year (Table 6-2). 
 
{1, 2, 3}  The Grand Coalition represents all three players working to cooperatively 
increase their benefits.  District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 share equally in the 
payment of compensation to District 005 for water buybacks (Table 5-5).  District 005 
has the greatest improvement in water delivery under this coalition (Table 5-6).  By 
joining this coalition, District 005 has a reduced demand for water, but they get more 
reliable deliveries for the reduced demand.  District 025 has increased performance, but 
not as large as District 005’s.  Their largest improvement lies in the increased Reliability 
and ability to recover from deficits (Resilience).  Watermaster Section 10 has the smallest 
improvement of all players in the coalition.  This minimal improvement can be attributed 
to the small amount of additional water that they receive after the system losses and the 
treaty division. The value of this coalition is the sum of Equations 4-11 through 4-13,   








Table 5-5 Demands, Deliveries, and Values for the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 519 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 44.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -21.7 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  $Million/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM 393 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 33.8 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -21.7 







Table 5-6 Performance Criteria for Coalition {1, 2, 3} Including Change in Performance 












District 005 +10 -2 +25 +43 
District 025 +4 0 +14 +14 
Watermaster 




5.1.2 COOPERATIVE GAME ANALYSIS 
The characteristic values for the Water Reduction Game were calculated for each 
coalition ranging from non-cooperative to fully cooperative Grand Coalitions.  These 
characteristic values are used in a cooperative game analysis to determine the value of 
cooperation and provide the players the opportunity to negotiate and divide the benefits 
of that cooperation.  This section describes the results of the cooperative game analysis.  
 
5.1.2.1 The Core 
 The characteristic values for the coalitions under the Water Demand Reduction 
game for the 60-year long-term period are displayed in Table 5-7.  The characteristic 
values are the monetary value of the minimum water delivery to each player in the 
coalition over the 60-year period as described in Section 4.2.5.  These characteristic 
values are used to determine the existence of the Core.  The Core defines a set of 
solutions that satisfies individual and collective rationality, or in other words, a set of 
solutions or allocations which each player is willing to accept from negotiation (see 
Section 3.2).  The Core of the Water Demand Reduction game is defined by the bounds 






Ω 1  6.4 
Ω 1, 2, 3 2, 3  32.6 
Ω 2 34.4 
Ω 1, 2, 3 1, 3  44.7 
Ω 3  30.7 
Ω 1, 2, 3 1, 2  33.8 
 









v(1, 2) 63.8 
v(1, 3) 52.9 
v(2, 3) 65.0 
v(1, 2, 3) 97.6 
 
If there are more than 3 players, as in the Syr Darya game (Appendix), then the 
Core cannot be displayed on a simplex.  The Water Demand Reduction game involves 
only 3 players so the Core may be drawn on a simplex as shown in Figure 5-5.  The 
overall height of the simplex is $97.6 million, corresponding to the value of the Grand 
Coalition.  The Core is bounded by the minimum value that a single player is willing to 
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accept and the maximum value that the other players in the coalition are willing to give 
that player under the Grand Coalition.   
The Core for the Water Demand Reduction game exhibits some interesting 
characteristics.  One interesting characteristic is that District 005, Player 1, has a 
negotiation range from $19.1 million to $32.6 million.  The non-cooperative solution for 
District 005 is $6.4 million, but according to the Core, the lowest that District 005 will 
ever receive is $19.1 million.  This minimum value corresponds to the upper right corner 
of the Core.  This increased lower bound is due to the other players’ dependence on 
District 005 for cooperation.  Without the cooperation of District 005, a game does not 
exist and the other players cannot improve their allocation. 
Another interesting characteristic of the Core is that Player 3, Watermaster 
Section 10, has a very narrow negotiation range from $30.7 million to $33.8 million.  
This narrow range demonstrates that this player brings very little additional benefit to the 
Grand Coalition because of the small improvement in their allocation as described in 
Section 5.1.1.  Watermaster Section 10’s stability in this game will be examined in 





Figure 5-5 The Core of the Water Reduction Game for the 60-year period 
 
5.1.2.2 Allocation Methods 
The Core defines a set of possible allocations to each player from the value of the 
Grand Coalition.  To select a single allocation, two methods are employed in this 
research.  The first method is the Shapley value, which selects a point in the Core based 
on the marginal contribution of each player to the Grand Coalition, or in other terms, 
each player receives an allocation of the coalition gains proportional to their contribution 
to the coalition gains (Table 5-8).  For this game, the Shapley value is calculated as Ω1 = 

















Table 5-8 Calculation of the Shapley Allocation 
Permutation Unit 
Marginal Contribution of Player to the Coalition
1 2 3 
123 Million $ 6 57 34 
132 Million $ 6 45 47 
213 Million $ 29 34 34 
231 Million $ 33 34 31 
312 Million $ 22 45 31 
321 Million $ 33 34 31 
Shapley Allocation Million $ 21.6 41.7 34.4 
Percent of Profit % 22 42 35 
 
The Core represents the gains of the whole coalition which are the sum of each 
coalition player’s use of the minimum delivery volume for agricultural profit.  The 
individual profits are summed and the gains divided according to the allocation method.  
In the Grand Coalition, District 005 has a minimum delivery value of $19 million (see 
Table 5-9) but can negotiate for an additional $3.0 million from the Grand Coalition.  
District 025 has a minimum delivery value of $44.6 million but must share $2.6 million 
of this value to the coalition for cooperation.  District 025 shares $2.6 million of their 
coalition allocation of $42 million which is still larger than their non-cooperative value of 
$34.4 million. Watermaster Section 10 has a minimum delivery value of $33.8 million 
but receives an additional $0.4 million from the Core for an allocation of $34.4.  From 
the overall profits of cooperation, these are the values that each player could expect to 
receive annually as a result of negotiation.  As can be seen from the results, each player 
can expect to receive an increase over their non-cooperative values (Table 5-9). 
Another method for determining an allocation from the Core is the Nucleolus.  
The Nucleolus is based on minimizing the least satisfied coalition member (Schmeidler, 
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1969), meaning the Nucleolus minimizes the greatest difference in coalition allocations 
and a player’s minimum allocation or increases the smallest allocation.  The Nucleolus 
allocations, Ωi to each player i = 1 to N, where N equals the total number of players, are 




  Ω 6.4 
  Ω 34.4 
  Ω 30.7 
  Ω Ω 63.8 
  Ω Ω 52.9 
  Ω Ω 65.0 
Ω Ω Ω 97.6 
 
Under the Shapley allocation, District 025 had to share $2.6 million of their 
coalition allocation from their $42 million water allocation, making them the least 
satisfied player.  The Nucleolus increases District 025’s allocation to $43.4 by reducing 
Watermaster Section 10’s allocation to $32.2 million.  Under the Nucleolus allocation, as 
with the Shapley allocation, each player receives an increased allocation over their non-

















District 005 6.40 21.6 22.2 
District 025 34.4 41.7 43.4 
Watermaster Section 10  30.7 34.4 32.2 
 
5.1.2.3 Stability 
Both the Shapley and Nucleolus provide an allocation that improves each player’s 
value above their Non-Cooperative allocations.  Each allocation method is based on 
mathematical concepts for a ‘fair’ allocation. To evaluate the stability of the allocation 
solutions, the Gately equation, or the propensity to disrupt, is used to measure a player’s 
ability to harm other players by leaving the coalition.  The propensity to disrupt compares 
a player’s loss from leaving the coalition to the loss of the remaining coalition members.  
If a player has a large propensity to disrupt compared to the other players, then their 
allocation should be improved to ensure that they do not leave the coalition.  The 
propensity to disrupt is measured relative to each player in a coalition and should be close 
to zero if a player is satisfied.  The propensity to disrupt for each player under both the 














District 005 0.7 0.7 
District 025 0.4 0.2 
Watermaster Section 10 -0.2 0.9 
  
District 005 has the same propensity to disrupt under both the Shapley and 
Nucleolus allocation schemes.  This is due to the fact that both allocations are roughly 
equal (Table 5-9).  Changes in propensity to disrupt can be seen in District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10.  Watermaster Section 10 has a negative propensity to disrupt, 
indicating that they would lose more by leaving the coalition compared to the other 
players.  However, under the Nucleolus allocation, when District 005 receives a 
decreased allocation, their propensity to disrupt approaches one.  Conversely, 
Watermaster 10’s propensity to disrupt is increased from the Shapley under the 
Nucleolus. 
 All players, under both allocation schemes, have propensities to disrupt under 
one.  This means that the loss to the other coalition members by them leaving the 
coalition is less than what they would lose leaving the coalition.  The loss to District 025 
and Watermaster Section 10 is small compared to the loss incurred by District 005 
leaving the Grand Coalition.  Either allocation method would create a suitable starting 





The Water Demand Reduction game assumes that the downstream players fully 
fund the water buy-backs in District 005.  However, the losses in the Rio Grande/Bravo 
are large as water travels from the Rio Conchos to the lower part of the basin.  Eighty 
percent of the water released from the Rio Conchos basin is lost before reaching the users 
in the lower basin (Sandoval et al., 2008).  Due to these large losses the compensation 
value from the lower basin players to District 005 was scaled back based on their actual 
deliveries.  For analysis, an assumption was made that District 005 would still be 
compensated for the 502 MCM of water rights bought back, but District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10 would only compensate District 005 for the portion of water 
which they receive.  A further assumption is made that the remainder of the 
compensation would be paid by Mexico’s Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA). 
5.2.1 COALITIONS 
CONAGUA provides compensation to District 005 in this analysis but they are 
not considered a player in the game because they do not receive an allocation of the 
benefits.  The coalitions remain the same as described in Section 4.2.2 but the 
calculation for the partial coalitions with District 005 and the grand coalition change.  
Under these coalitions, the compensation has been changed to reflect the payment from 





{1, 2}  For the partial coalition of Districts 005 and 025, District 025 purchases a fraction 
of the water rights, V1,2 (MCM), from District 005 at a price, p1,2 ($/MCM). The fraction 
of water rights purchased by District 025, V1,2, is equal to the amount that is delivered to 
them after accounting for the 1944 Treaty division and the system losses.  CONAGUA 
purchases the remaining water rights, VMX (MCM), at a price pMX ($/MCM).   District 005 
receives a modified minimum delivery volume, min_D1’ = min_D1-V1,2 (MCM). District 
025 receives a modified minimum delivery volume, min_D2’ (MCM).  The monetary 
values to Districts 005 and 025 are calculated as 
 
District 005 -   pD*min_D1’ + p1,2* V1,2 + pMX *VMX    Equation 5-1 
District 025 -  pD*min_D2
’
 - p1,2* V1,2   Equation 5-2 
 
The characteristic value of this coalition, v(1,2) , is the sum of equations 5-1 and 5-2. 
 
 
{1, 3}  For the partial coalition of Districts 005 and Watermaster Section 10, 
Watermaster Section 10 purchase a fraction of the water rights, V1,3 (MCM), from District 
005 at a price, p1,3 ($/MCM).  The volume of water rights that Watermaster Section 10 
purchases from District 005, V1,3,  is equal to their volume of delivery after accounting 
for the 1944 Treaty division and the large system losses. CONAGUA purchases the 
remaining water rights, VMX (MCM), at a price pMX ($/MCM). District 005 receives a 
modified average minimum volume, min_D1’ (MCM).  Watermaster Section 10 receives 
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a modified minimum delivery of min_D3’ (MCM).  The monetary values to Districts 005 
and Watermaster Section 10 are 
 
 District 005 -   pD*min_D1
’ + p1,3*V1,3 + pMX *VMX   Equation 5-3 
 Watermaster Section 10 - pD*min_D3
’
 - p1,3*V1,3   Equation 5-4 
 
The characteristic value for this partial coalition, v(1,3) is the sum of equations 5-3 and 5-
4. 
 
{1, 2, 3} All players cooperate under the Grand Coalition.  District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10 each finance part of the water right buy-back in DR005.  District 
025 receives a modified minimum delivery of min_D2’’ (MCM), and in turn, they 
compensate District 005 for a portion of the water buy-back volume, V1,2 (MCM).  
Watermaster Section 10 receives a modified minimum delivery of min_D3’’ (MCM) and 
compensates District 005 for a portion of the water rights bought back, V1,3 (MCM).  
District 005 is compensated for the remaining fraction of the water rights VMX (MCM), by 
CONAGUA, at a price pMX ($/MCM).   District 005 receives compensation from 
CONAGUA, District 025 and the Watermaster Section 10 and a modified minimum 
delivery of min_D1
’’. The monetary values to District 005, District 025 and Watermaster 




District 005 -  pD*min_D1
” + p1,2*V1,2  + p1,`3*V1,3+  pMX *VMX              Equation 5-5 
District 025 - pD*min_D2
” - p1,2*V1,2                          Equation 5-6 
Watermaster Section 10 - pD*min_D3
” - p1,3*V1,3              Equation 5-7 
 
The characteristic value of the Grand Coalition, v(1,2,3) is calculated as the sum of 
equations 5-5 through 5-7. 
 
5.2.2  RESULTS 
The characteristic functions for the Water Reduction Game with the inclusion of 
CONAGUA were calculated in the same manner described in Section 5.1.1.  The 
coalitions that do not include compensation from CONAGUA do not change under this 
scheme.  The water deliveries and compensation for each of the non-cooperative coalition 
({1}, {2}, and {3}) are the same as shown in Table 5-1 in Section 5.1.1.  The water 
deliveries and compensation values for the partial coalition of District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10, {2, 3},  do not change in this analysis and are equal to the sum 
of their non-cooperative values shown in Table 5-1.  The performance measures do not 
change from the long-term analysis to this compensation analysis and therefore will not 
be discussed in this analysis. 
In this analysis of the compensation scheme, an assumption is made that the lower 
basin players, District 025 and Watermaster Section 10, compensate District 005 for only 
a portion of water buy-backs while CONAGUA pays the difference.  District 025 
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compensates District 005 for 12% of the buy-back volume because this percentage is 
equal to the two-thirds of the 20% volume delivery accounting for system losses and for 
the 1944 Treaty division of Rio Conchos water to Mexico.  Table 5-11 displays the 
amount that District 005 receives in compensation for the water buy-backs.  Also shown 
in Table 5-11 are the amounts which District 025, Watermaster Section 10, and 
CONAGUA pay to District 005 under the various coalition structures.   
 
Table 5-11 Compensation Values for Water Buy-Backs in District 005 under the various 







Section 10 CONAGUA 
1,2 43.2 -5.8  -37.4 
1,3 43.2  -2.9 -40.3 
1,2,3 43.2 -5.8 -2.9 -34.5 
 
 
Under the partial coalition of District 005 and District 025, {1, 2}, District 005 is 
compensated $43.3 million for the purchase of their water rights and reduces their overall 
demand.  District 025 compensates District 005 $5.8 million and receives an increased 
minimum delivery.  CONAGUA compensate District 005 $37.4 million to cover the 




Table 5-12 Demands, Deliveries, Values for Coalition {1, 2} Including Compensation 
from CONAGUA 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 519 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 44.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -5.8 
CONAGUA Value of Compensation $Million/year -37.4 
Coalition Value   $Million/year 101.2 
 
 
For the partial coalition, {1, 3}, between District 005 and Watermaster Section 
10, District 005 sells their water rights for $43.3 million.  Watermaster Section 10 
compensates them for 6% of the water rights bought-back, or $2.9 million.  Watermaster 
Section 10 only pays for the portion of District 005’s water rights which could be 
delivered to them after the 1944 Treaty division and the large system losses.  CONAGUA 
contributes $34.5 million to District 005 (Table 5-13).   
Under the Grand Coalition, {1, 2, 3}, District 005 agrees to decrease their demand 
to 628 MCM/year for a total compensation of $43.3 million.  District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10 compensate District 005 for 18% of the water buy-backs, or $7.7 




Table 5-13 Demands, Deliveries, Values for Coalition {1, 3} Including Compensation 
from CONAGUA 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 393 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 33.8 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -2.9 
CONAGUA Value of Compensation $Million/year -34.5 
Coalition Value   $Million/year 93.2 
 
Table 5-14 Demands, Deliveries, and Values for the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3} Including 
Compensation from CONAGUA 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 222 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 19.1 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 519 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 44.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -5.8 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  $Million/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM 393 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 33.8 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -2.9 
CONAGUA Value of Compensation $Million/year -34.5 














v(1, 2) 101.2 
v(1, 3) 93.2 
v(2, 3) 65.0 
v(1, 2, 3) 132.1 
 
From the characteristic values displayed in Table 5-15, the Core of the Water 
Demand Reduction game under the low flow analysis is defined by the bounds of 
allocations, Ωi, to each player i as: 
 
Ω 1  6.4 
Ω 1, 2, 3 2, 3  67.1 
Ω 2 34.4 
Ω 1, 2, 3 1, 3  39.0 
Ω 3  30.7 




The Water Demand Reduction game has 3 players who are dividing the benefits 
of cooperation.  CONAGUA provides funding to District 005 under the various coalitions 
discussed in this section, but they do not receive a share of the coalition benefits and are 
therefore, not considered a player in the game.  The Core of this game is shown on the 
simplex in Figure 5-6.  The overall height of this simplex is equal to the Grand Coalition 
value, $132.1 million.  
 
Figure 5-6 Core of the Water Reduction Game with the Inclusion of Compensation from 
CONAGUA 
 
Under the compensation scheme presented in this section with the inclusion of 
compensation from CONAGUA, the size of the Core is reduced compared to the size of 


















Watermaster Section 10 varies by only $0.2 million and District 025’s varies by $4.5 
million.   The Core is shifted towards District 005 indicating an increase in their 
allocation, while it has shifted away from District 025 and Watermaster 10 illustrating a 
decrease in their allocation.  The Shapley allocation of this game does not fall inside the 
Core and does not satisfy the conditions of individual and group rationality and cannot be 
considered as an allocation.  Since the Shapley allocation is not in the Core, the 
Nucleolus is used to select an allocation from the Core.   
District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 have a decrease in their allocation under 
the compensation scheme with the inclusion of CONAGUA but still maintain an increase 
over their non-cooperative values (Figure 5-7).  Watermaster Section 10’s allocation is 
$0.1 million above their non-cooperative allocation while District 025’s is $2.2 million 
above their non-cooperative allocation.  District 005, however, has a substantial increase 
in their allocation with an additional $42 million.   The change in the allocations is 
strictly due to the increases in the coalition values that include District 005 and the 
compensation from CONAGUA (Table 5-16).  The increase in District 005 coalitions 
correspond directly to the CONAGUA compensation values shown in the earlier Table 5-
11.   
District 005 provides most of the value to Grand Coalition under this scheme 
compared to the game without CONAGUA and therefore receives most of the value.   
Based on the cooperative analysis of the compensation scheme, District 005 would 
benefit the most; however, the downstream players receive a smaller allocation which is 
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almost equal to their non-cooperative allocations.  These results indicate that District 025 
and Watermaster Section 10 may prefer the cooperative game without the inclusion of 
CONAGUA.  The game theory calculations under this compensation scheme may not be 
the correct method for inclusion of an external funding source because it decreases the 




Figure 5-7 Comparison of the Non-Cooperative Allocations with the Nucleolus 



































Non-Cooperative Without CONAGUA With CONAGUA
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v(1, 2) 37.4 
v(1, 3) 40.3 
v(2, 3) 0 




5.3 Drought Analysis 
An assumption was made in the Water Demand Reduction game that the demand 
remains constant throughout the simulation period, including drought periods.  To 
determine the effects of drought on the game analysis, a period of historical drought in 
the basin was selected.  The Record Drought in the Rio Grande/Bravo occurred from 
1948 to1957 as shown in Figure 5-8 (Sandoval-Solis et al., 2008).   The cooperative 
game concepts are applied to the Record Drought.  The Water Demand Reduction game 
is concerned with agricultural water deliveries, so to measure the effect of the water 
management scenario in critical periods of drought, the performance metrics of 
Vulnerability and Reliability are calculated for each player.  The metric of Resilience 
does not apply for this analysis because it is dependent on the continuous annual flow 
sequence (See section 4.2.5).  Resilience is a measure of a systems ability to recover from 
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a deficit over time and in this analysis only the drought years are selected without the 
following non-drought years, so the recovery cannot be measured.   
 
Figure 5-8 Periods of Drought in the Rio Grande/Bravo as shown in the Annual 




The characteristic functions were calculated in the same manner described in 
Section 5.1.1.  This analysis does not include the compensation described in Section 5.2.    
Under the non-cooperative coalitions, District 005 has a minimum delivery of 251 MCM, 
District 025 has a minimum delivery of 520 MCM and Watermaster Section 10 has a 
minimum delivery of 54.9 MCM (Table 5-17).  Each non-cooperative coalition has an 





























this drought analysis, Watermaster Section 10’s minimum delivery is 98% of their annual 
demand (Table 5-17). 
 
Table 5-17 Demands, Deliveries, and Characteristic Values for Non-Cooperative 
Coalitions {1}, {2}, {3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand MCM 1131 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 251 
Coalition Value $Million/year 21.6 
District 025 
Annual Demand MCM 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 530 
Coalition Value $Million/year 45.6 
Watermaster Section 10 
Annual Demand MCM 647 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 638 
Coalition Value $Million/year 54.9 
  
District 005 and District 025 work cooperatively in the partial coalition {1, 2}.  
District 025 provides compensation to reduce District 005’s annual water demand and in 
return, they receive an increased delivery (Table 5-18).  Under this coalition, both players 
have an increased minimum delivery over the 60 year long-term analysis.  Through 
cooperation under the Record Drought, District 005 and District 025 receive 100% of 
their annual demand for a coalition value, v(1,2) = $151 million. 
 In the partial coalition {1, 3} Watermaster Section 10 funds water buy-backs in 
District 005 to reduce District 005’s annual water demand (Table 5-19).  Each player 
receives an increased water delivery compared to their non-cooperative values.  Under 
91 
 
this cooperative coalition, both players in this coalition receive 100% of their annual 




Table 5-18 Demands, Deliveries, and Values for Coalition {1, 2} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 628 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 54.0 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 1127 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 96.9 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 




Table 5-19 Demands, Deliveries, Values for Coalition {1, 3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 628 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 54.0 
Value of Compensation MCM 43.3 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  $Million/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM 646 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 55.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 





The partial coalition {2, 3} cannot increase their benefit beyond the sum of their 
non-cooperative coalition values without the inclusion of District 005.  The value of this 
partial coalition is v(2,3) = $100.4 million.  This partial coalition value is higher than the 
value in the 60 year long-term analysis because each player’s minimum delivery is larger 
in the Record Drought period (Table 5-21).  The coalition value is higher because the 
minimum delivery for these players occurs in the 1990’s which is not included in the 
Record Drought period. 
In the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3}, all of the players in the game work cooperatively 
to increase their benefits beyond their individual coalition values. The downstream 
players, District 025 and Watermaster Section 10, fund the purchase of water rights in 
District 005 to reduce District 005’s annual demand.  In turn, each of the downstream 
players receives an increased water delivery.  Under this coalition, each player has a 
minimum delivery equal to 100% of their annual demand (Table 5-20).  The value of the 
Grand Coalition is v(1, 2, 3) = $206.5. 
The characteristic values for the 60 year long-term analysis and the Record 
Drought are calculated from the minimum delivery during that period to each player 
(Table 5-21).  The non-cooperative coalition value for District 005, v(1), is lower in the 
60 year long-term analysis because the minimum delivery falls outside of the drought 
period under consideration (Table 5-21).  The minimum delivery to District 005 occurs in 
1958 when there is high flow in the basin.  The minimum delivery to District 005 
occurring outside the drought period is likely due to storage in the reservoirs being high 
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enough to supply District 005’s demand during the drought.  As the drought progressed 
the storage levels likely fell to a level that could not support District 005’s demand.  
 
Table 5-20 Demands, Deliveries, and Values for the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3} 
Player Category Unit Amount 
District 005 
Annual Demand  MCM 628 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 628 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 54.0 
Value of Compensation $Million/year 43.3 
District 025 
Annual Demand  MCM/year 1127 
Minimum Delivery MCM/year 1127 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 96.9 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 
Watermaster Section 
10 
Annual Demand  $Million/year 646 
Minimum Delivery MCM 646 
Value of Delivery $Million/year 55.6 
Value of Compensation $Million/year -43.3 
Coalition Value   $Million/year 206.5 
 
 
Table 5-21 Characteristic Values for the 60 Year Long-Term Analysis and the Record 
Drought  
Coalition 60 Year Record Drought 
v(1) 6.4 21.6 
v(2) 34.4 45.6 
v(3) 30.6 54.9 
v(1, 2) 63.8 151.0 
v(1, 3) 52.9 109.6 
v(2, 3) 65.0 100.4 
v(1, 2, 3) 97.6 206.5 
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The Core for the Record Drought is displayed on a simplex in Figure 5-9. The 
Core bounds for the Watermaster Section 10, under the Record Drought, have narrowed 
significantly, leaving their negotiation range at $0.7 million.  The Core has also shifted 
towards District 005 and 025, increasing their upper bounds on negotiation, as well as, 
increasing their negotiation space.  This increase is due to the size of the partial coalition 
of Districts 005 and 025 {1, 2} compared to the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3}.  Most of the 
$206.5 million of the Grand Coalition is negotiated for by these players because their 
partial coalition value, v(1,2), is 73% of the Grand Coalition value.  Watermaster Section 
10’s non-cooperative value, v(3), increased by 18% while District 025’s non-cooperative 
value, v(2), increased 39% and a District 005, v(1) had a significant increase of 65% 
(Table 5-21). 
 
Figure 5-9 The Core for the Record Drought Analysis 
















From the Core an allocation may be selected utilizing one of the methods 
discussed in Section 3.3.  For this analysis, the Shapley values are compared for the 
Grand Coalition allocations to all players in both the 60 year long-term analysis and the 
Record Drought (Figure 5-10).   Under the Record Drought analysis all of the players 
receive a larger allocation than under the 60 year long-term analysis.  This increase 
occurs because none of the players’ minimum deliveries from the 60 year analysis occur 
in the Record Drought.  The minimum deliveries for District 025 and Watermaster 
Section 10, under the 60year analysis, occur in the late 1990s.  Since the minimum 




Figure 5-10 Comparison of the Shapley Values for Each Player in the 60 Year Long-




































 The delivery measures under the Record Drought are not compared to the 60 year 
long-term analysis due to the disparate number years.  To determine the effect of the 
drought analysis, the change from the non-cooperative coalitions to the Grand Coalition 
are evaluated.  Each player would receive an increased allocation under the Record 
Drought, however, only District 005 would have significantly improved water deliveries 
as indicated by the change in their water delivery measures from the non-cooperative 
values to the Grand Coalition (Table 5-22).  District 005 has a significant improvement of 
more than 30% in all delivery measures, including a78% change in minimum delivery 
and 70% increase in reliability (Table 5-22).   
Under the Record Drought, Watermaster Section 10 has a notable change of 20% 
in Reliability and less than 1% change in the other measures (Table 5-22).  If 
Watermaster Section 10 were to join this coalition, they would experience increased 
water delivery Reliability and but only a slight change under drought conditions.  
Watermaster Section 10 would only receive an increase in Reliability and allocation from 
the Grand Coalition under the Record Drought Conditions.  In contrast, District 025 
increases all of their performance measures with a 17% increase in their minimum 
delivery (Table 5-22).  District 025 would receive an increase in all performance 





Table 5-22 Percent Change in Performance Measures for each Player between the Non-
Cooperative Coalitions and Grand Coalition Under the Record Drought  
Player 
Minimum 
Delivery     
(% Change) 
Average 






District 005 78 30 70 -41 
District 025 17 5 10 -5 





This section described a cooperative game analysis of the Water Demand 
Reduction game.  This analysis showed that each player received an increased allocation 
under the Grand Coalition.  The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus were used to select an 
allocation of the cooperative gains.  While these allocations yielded different results, an 
analysis of the propensity to disrupt showed that there each allocation was a reasonable 
starting point for negotiation.   
In addition to the cooperative game analysis, a set of performance measures were 
calculated.  The measures of Vulnerability, Reliability and Resilience demonstrated that 
under the cooperative solution, each player would receive a more dependable water 
supply.  District 005 would receive the greatest improvement due to the decrease in their 
overall water demand while the downstream players receive a smaller increase.  This 
small increase is due to the small amount of additional water these players would receive 
after accounting for the 1944 Treaty division and the large system losses as the water 
travels down the basin.   
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A second analysis evaluated the compensation scheme by inclusion of an outside 
funding source for the water buy-backs in District 005.  The downstream players, District 
025 and Watermaster Section 10, compensated District 005 only for the water they could 
receive after accounting for 1944 Treaty divisions and system losses.  Results showed 
that under this compensation scheme, District 005 received the largest benefit of all 
players in the game.   Due to District 005’s large gains from the Grand Coalitions, the 
other players have reduced gains under this analysis and would not agree to join this 
coalition. 
The last analysis presented in this section considered the Water Demand 
Reduction game under the Record Drought period of 1948 to 1957.  The Record Drought 
analysis showed that each player would receive an increased allocation.  This is largely 
due to the fact that the minimum deliveries for all users in this game fall outside of the 
Record Drought.  Under the Record Drought analysis, Districts 005 and 025 would 
receive increased allocations from the Grand Coalition and improve water delivery under 
drought conditions.  Although Watermaster Section 10 receives an increased allocation 
under this analysis, they only experience improved Reliability under the drought analysis.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
This research is aimed at coupling cooperative game theory with a comprehensive 
water management model for a transboundary river basin.  The objectives of this 
dissertation are to: 
1. Construct and calibrate a water-planning model to represent the physical and 
institutional characteristics of a large scale, transboundary river basin (the Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin) with multiple players, jurisdictions, and water uses in 
multiple sectors;  
2. Utilize the water-planning model to calculate values needed in the cooperative 
game theory calculations (characteristic function values); 
3. Create river basin games where players cooperate and learn the benefits of 
that cooperation.  The games in this research give players the opportunity to 
negotiate and divide the benefits of their cooperation;  
4. Create a cooperative game theory framework that can be used to evaluate the 
benefits of cooperation in other transboundary river basins and in future water 
management scenarios in the case study basin; and 






Cooperative game theory was applied to the transboundary Rio Grande/Bravo basin 
as a study area.  A comprehensive water planning model, described in detail in Section 
4.1, was developed for the basin from the confluence of the Rio Conchos to the Gulf of 
Mexico, including the major tributaries in both the U.S. and Mexico.  This model was 
constructed with the most comprehensive data set available for this basin.  The model 
contains hydrologic and hydraulic information for period of 1940-2000 and includes over 
135 surface water demand nodes representing more than 6,700 MCM/year of water 
demand.  Twenty-five reservoirs with over 22 MCM of storage capacity are also included 
in the model.  In addition to the physical attributes of the basin, the model contains logic 
for legal institutions in the basin including the two major water sharing agreements, the 
1906 Convention and the 1944 Treaty, between the U.S. and Mexico.   
Model calibration and testing demonstrates that the Rio Grande/Bravo water 
planning model captures the behavior of water management decisions in the basin.  
Historical water storage in the U.S. and Mexican accounts in the two bi-national 
reservoirs, La Amistad and Falcon, were compared to the modeled storage values.  For 
the 15-year period of analysis, the difference between the historical and modeled storage 
is 3.6% for the Mexican accounts and 4.3% for the U.S. accounts.    
A water management scenario was selected and evaluated as a cooperative game.  
The Water Demand Reduction game was developed with the players selected as the three 
largest individual agricultural water users in the basin; District 005, District 025 and 
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Watermaster Section 10.  These players, located in both Mexico and the United States, 
were allocated the potential gains of cooperation rather than allocating the gains to the 
two countries as was done in previous transboundary river cooperative games. 
The characteristic functions for the Water Demand Reduction game were calculated 
in monetary values using the Rio Grande/Bravo water planning model to determine the 
water delivery volumes.  The characteristic functions were based on the minimum 
deliveries to a player over a certain period.  The cooperative games were calculated for a 
60-year, long-term period, a different compensation scheme which included outside 
funding and a record drought period to determine the effects of compensation changes 
and drought on the outcomes of the game. 
In addition to the cooperative game analysis, performance measures were 
calculated for the water deliveries to each player.  These performance measures were 
used to characterize the timing and reliability of the water deliveries to the players under 
the Water Demand Reduction game.   In the Grand Coalition, District 005 received the 
highest increase in performance.  This delivery improvement is due to the decreased 
water demand, which no longer overtaxes the system.   
Under the Grand Coalition, District 025 and Watermaster Section 10 experience 
small increases in their water delivery performance.  The largest benefit to District 025 is 
an increase in both the Reliability and Resilience of their deliveries.   The small changes 
in water delivery performance are related to the small volumes of additional water 
available to each downstream player.  The downstream players received small volumes of 
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additional water because of the 1944 Treaty and system losses.  The 1944 Treaty divides 
any water from the Rio Conchos with 1/3 to the U.S. and 2/3 to Mexico.  Additionally, 
any water from the Rio Conchos has an 80% system loss before reaching the lower basin.  
These losses create small deliveries to the downstream players, particularly Watermaster 
Section 10, who receives only 1/3 of water from the Rio Conchos.  
The characteristic functions of the game were calculated based on the minimum 
annual delivery to each player.  A monetary value of these minimum deliveries was 
determined based on agricultural production.  From the characteristic functions, a Core of 
the game was determined.  The Core demonstrated the effects of the small increases in 
water to the downstream players, especially Watermaster Section 10, with their narrow 
negotiation ranges which can be attributed to their small deliveries after the division 
under the 1944 Treaty and the 80% system losses.  From the Core, the Shapley and 
Nucleolus allocation methods were applied to select unique allocations from the Core.  
Utilizing the concept of the propensity to disrupt, the stability of each of these allocations 
were calculated and the analysis demonstrated that they provided similar results. 
Under both the Shapley and the Nucleolus, District 005 receives the largest 
increase in benefits.  This is largely due to the fact that a game does not exist without the 
inclusion of District 005.  However, without the inclusion of the downstream players 
District 005 does not have an opportunity to improve their allocation, so there is incentive 
to share the gains with the downstream players.  
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Further analysis revealed that including CONAGUA in the compensation scheme 
in the Water Demand Reduction game was not an appropriate method.  The 
compensation to District 005 outweighed the benefits to District 025 and Watermaster 
Section 10, who had larger monetary benefits under their non-cooperative coalitions than 
in the Grand Coalition.  Also, the changes in performance measures to District 025 and 
Watermaster Section 10 were not large enough to overcome their decreased allocation 
under the compensation scheme.  There was no indication that either downstream player 
would cooperate under the compensation scheme. 
The final analysis compared the cooperative game outcomes of a Record Drought 
(1948-1957) analysis to the 60-year, long-term analysis.   Under the drought analysis, the 
allocations to each player were increased with the Shapley Allocation from the Grand 
Coalition.  These allocations were higher than under the 60 year analysis because the 
minimum deliveries under the 60 year analysis are not captured in the Record Drought.  
The increase in minimum deliveries increases the value of the Grand Coalition and in 
turn, the allocations to each player.  Under this analysis, Watermaster Section 10 could 
agree to join the Grand Coalition. 
In all three analyses, District 005 receives the greatest increase in benefit through 
cooperation.  Their large increase in allocated benefit occurs because a game does not 
occur without District005.  The two lower basin players have an increased benefit, but 
without an option to form a partial coalition without District 005, they cannot increase 
their allocations.  It is important to note that without the inclusion of the downstream 
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players, there is also not a game.  Due to this characteristic, District 005 has incentive to 
share coalition benefits with the downstream players. 
6.2 Conclusions 
This dissertation met the objectives outlined in the Introduction and described in 
Section 6.1 as follows: 
1.  A water management planning model was constructed and calibrated for a 
large scale, transboundary river basin utilizing the Rio Grande/Bravo basin as 
a case study.  This planning model included over 155 water demand sites, 25 
storage reservoirs and logic for water policies related to bi-national water 
sharing agreements.  Testing and calibration of storage values in the two 
international reservoirs shows that the water planning model is a reasonable 
representation of water management in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin.  
2. The water planning model was used to calculate the minimum delivery to each 
player, in each coalition in the game which was set at the characteristic value 
for each coalition.  
3. The Water Demand Reduction Game allowed players to cooperate to fund 
water buy-backs in the District 005.  From the characteristic functions, the 




4. The analysis presented in this dissertation allows for the creation of 
transboundary river basin games where players cooperate and learn the 
benefits of that cooperation.  The games in this research give players the 
opportunity to negotiate and divide the benefits of their cooperation as 
demonstrated with the determination of the Core;  
5. The methods utilized in this dissertation can be applied to any transboundary 
river basin to for any management scenario determine if cooperation provides 
additional benefits to each player.  For the case study basin, the Rio 
Grande/Bravo, these same concepts can be applied to any player and an; and 
6. Each of the objectives has been applied to the Rio Grande/Bravo Basin as a 
case study.  
Cooperative game theory can be applied to transboundary river basins to measure 
the additional benefits from cooperation.  Cooperative game theory also provides tools to 
equitably allocate the potential gains of cooperation of the coalition to the individual 
players in that coalition.  Cooperative game theory has also been applied to the Syr Darya 
in Central Asia (see Appendix) allocating cooperative benefits to the individual countries 
as the players demonstrating that each country benefits through participation in the new 
treaty.  The cooperative game theory is flexible in player definition in transboundary river 
basins. 
This research has shown that cooperative game theory can be a useful tool for 
evaluating the water management scenarios in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin in conjunction 
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with the Rio Grande/Bravo water planning model.  The water planning model is a 
reasonable representation of water management in the basin for both the U.S. and Mexico 
and allows the cooperative game analysis to be applied to individual players in the basin.  
The water planning model is created from a comprehensive database of the Rio 
Grande/Bravo and additional data in the model would likely not improve the results of 
the cooperative game analysis. 
Increased minimum water deliveries provide additional benefits to the players in 
the Water Demand Reduction Game.  However, relatively small water volumes are 
available to District 025 and Watermaster 10 after the water rights buy-backs in District 
005.  These small volumes are due to the large system losses (80%) and the 1944 Treaty 
division of water from the Rio Conchos reaching the Rio Grande/Bravo.  This restriction 
is especially clear with Watermaster 10 with their small increases in performance 
measures, as well as, their narrow negotiation range in the Core. 
The selected water management scenario used in this analysis does not indicate 
that there is enough benefit provided to each player to cooperate.  The lower basin 
players, who would fund the water rights buy-backs in District 005, do not receive 
sufficient benefit from their water deliveries to offset the cost associated with the buy-
backs, especially when considering the additional compensation scheme with the 
inclusion of CONAGUA.  However, under the Record Drought analysis presented in this 
dissertation, the downstream players may agree to implement the scenario based on their 




This dissertation has shown that cooperative game theory can be a useful tool for 
determining increased benefits from cooperation and allocating those benefits to 
individuals in a game and it has also been shown as effective tool in allocating the gains 
to countries as in the case of the Syr Darya. The Rio Grande/Bravo game selected for this 
research does not provide enough benefit to some of the players to implement this 
scenario. Additional research is needed related to the economic values used in this 
cooperative game application.  Each player may value their water at different rates which 
could affect the outcomes of the game.  Additionally, the compensation scheme needs to 
be evaluated to determine what value District 005 would accept to retire their water 
rights.  This application assumed that District 005 would require the same value for 
delivery and each million cubic meter of bought back water right.  Further analysis is 
needed to determine a realistic value for water buy-backs. 
Additional research is required for the drought analysis.  While the drought 
analysis in this dissertation has shown increased benefits to players in the Water Demand 
Reduction game, this drought analysis may not be an appropriate measure of drought.  
The minimum delivery in District 005 occurs in a different decade than the minimum 
deliveries in the lower basin.  This demonstrates that due to the large size of the Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin, a large deficit period in one part of the basin may not correspond to 
a large deficit period in another part of the basin.  As scenarios for climate change are 
developed and implemented in the Rio Grande/Bravo planning model, they should be 
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evaluated under the cooperative game analysis to determine their effects on the 
cooperative results.  Using climate change scenarios may demonstrate the importance of 
this type of planning for drought conditions. 
The game theory analysis needs to be applied water management scenarios which 
produce a larger benefit to the lower basin players.  The lower basin players need a large 
delivery to offset the losses in the basin and other scenarios need to be evaluated.  
Currently, more water management scenarios are being developed for the Rio 
Grande/Bravo basin.  These scenarios, especially the ones which implement management 
changes in the lower basin, should be evaluated under the cooperative game concepts to 
demonstrate the added value through cooperation to the players.  Allowing the lower 
basin players to cooperate without the inclusion of District 005, may give them more 
power in the negotiation and increase their allocations form the cooperative benefits. 
As new water management scenarios are developed, analysis with other players 
can be conducted.  The players in a game are not restricted to the three selected in this 
dissertation.  The flexibility of selecting players has been demonstrated in this 
dissertation and in the Syr Darya game (see Appendix).  Players in the games could be 
municipalities in addition to agricultural users, particularly when exploring the transfer of 
water supplies between the two users.  Another player could be the environment if 
environmental flows are considered in future scenarios.  This framework is flexible 
enough to consider other players in future analyses. 
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In addition to the cooperative game analysis, a set of performance measures for 
water deliveries were calculated.  The cooperative game analysis allocated the monetary 
benefits from the cooperation, but does not demonstrate the additional benefits a player 
could receive through cooperation.  The performance measures highlight the change in 
water delivery to each player and can be used by the players to determine if their 
additional benefit.  The measure of Reliability, or the probability of a deficit not 
occurring in a period, is important to report to show the improvement in deliveries to a 
player.  These performance measures could also be used to calculate the performance 
metric.  In this dissertation, minimum delivery was selected, but other performance 
metrics could be used.  
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River basin management is as varied as each basin under consideration.  Rapidly 
increasing populations and economic development in many basins often place additional 
demands on limited water supplies.  Transboundary river basins are basins which border 
two or more countries and add complexity to water management issues.  There are over 
200 transboundary river basins around the world (Wolf, 2002).  Water planning in these 
basins is often difficult because they are subject to the politics, laws and regulations of all 
the countries in those basins.   
Historically, riparian nations have shared transboundary river basins through 
treaties and agreements.  Wolf (2002) has identified over 400 such agreements signed 
since 1870.  The Syr Darya basin, located in Central Asia, is a transboundary river shared 
by four countries (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan).  The Syr Darya 
riparian countries have existing water sharing agreements and they are currently 
negotiating a new water agreement (ADB, 2007).  In this paper, we use cooperative game 
theory coupled with a water planning model to quantify the benefits of cooperation to the 
Syr Darya riparian countries under this new water and energy sharing agreement. 




The Syr Darya originates in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, and flows through 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before draining into the Aral Sea (Figure 1).  The 
Syr Darya presents unique transboundary water management challenges, because prior to 
1991 it was part of the Soviet Union and was managed by a single, central government 
that emphasized large-scale cotton production in the basin resulting in a large demand for 
growing period irrigation water (Weithal, 2002).  The 14-billion m3 active storage 
Toktogul reservoir was built in the Kyrgyz mountains to provide water storage for the 
large downstream irrigation demands.  Additional information about the Syr Darya basin 
and Central Asia can be found in Weinthal (2002), Antipova et al., (2002) McKinney 
(2003), and Micklin (2005).   
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Syr Darya 
became a transboundary river basin flowing through four countries rather than one, and 
the management of the river became much more difficult since each country attempted to 
maximize their benefits from the river, often at the expense of the other countries.  
Kyrgyzstan wanted to use the Toktogul and adjacent downstream cascade of reservoirs to 
generate wintertime hydropower, and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan wanted to use the 
water for summertime irrigation.  To reconcile the resulting competition for water 
between the newly independent nations, an agreement “On Cooperation in the Field of 
Joint Management and Conservation of Interstate Water Resources” was signed in 1992 
(Almaty agreement).  The Almaty agreement created the Interstate Commission for 
Water Cooperation (ICWC) and associated river basin organizations for the Syr Darya 




and Amu Darya and confirmed the previous Soviet water allocation levels for each 
country (ICWC, 1992).  Due to several factors over the ensuing years, including the 
transition to market-based pricing for fuels and other resources and a struggling 
economy, Kyrgyzstan increased winter releases from Toktogul reservoir for hydropower 
generation, leading to irrigation water deficits in the downstream countries.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of the Aral Sea basin showing the Syr Darya and Amu Darya (Source: 
The World Bank design by Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal 
http://go.worldbank.org/A7M424G5Z0) 
   




 To alleviate the developing water sharing problems in the basin, the riparian 
nations signed the “Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr 
Darya Basin” in 1998 (1998 Agreement) that outlined a power and water sharing 
agreement among the countries (ICWC, 1998). The 1998 agreement called for 
negotiating an annual water release schedule for Toktogul reservoir, the delivery to 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan of surplus electricity generated as a result of the releases, and 
fuel deliveries from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to compensate for foregone  
 Since the establishment of the 1998 Agreement, in some years (typically wet 
years), energy deliveries to Kyrgyzstan from the downstream countries have been less 
than needed for Kyrgyz wintertime energy needs.  In these years, Kyrgyzstan has 
increased winter releases from Toktogul to make up this energy deficit.  This has exposed 
difficulties in the 1998 Agreement: (1) multi-year hydrologic fluctuations are not taken 
into account; and (2) reservoir storage services are not valued.  The Syr Darya riparian 
countries are revising the Agreement to address these difficulties (ADB, 2007).  The 
revised Agreement follows a similar water and power sharing framework as the 1998 
Agreement, but adds consideration of storage (not just releases, see Table 1) in Toktogul 









Table 1.  Proposed Revision of the Schedule of Water Releases From Toktogul Reservoir 















Average 11.9 5.0 6.5  0.4 
Low 8.9 6.2 6.0 3.3  
High 14.9 4.0 7.0  3.9 
1. Vegetation period = April to September 
2. Non-vegetation period = October to March 
 
 Conflict over water use in the Syr Darya basin highlights the need for cooperation 
among the riparian countries.  Many transboundary river basin conflicts arise over due to 
asymmetries in access to data, wealth, or even location in a basin.  Locational asymmetry 
(i.e. upstream-downstream location) allows Kyrgyzstan, which owns and operates the 
basin’s major storage reservoir, to have strategic influence over the other countries in the 
Syr Darya basin, albeit, at the cost of angering the downstream countries because of 
flooding and irrigation water deficits.  So, while Kyrgyzstan may find itself in a position 
of some independence, it is also in a position to benefit from cooperation.  Cooperative 
game theory provides a means of computing the benefits of cooperation and the equitable 
allocation of cooperative gains to the riparian countries (Just and Netanyahu, 1998). 
Cooperative game theory has been applied in several areas of water resources 
management.  One of the first was presented by Rogers (1969) for the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra rivers where he demonstrated that game theory can provide a basis for 
treaty negotiation between Pakistan and India for their shared water resources.  Game 




theory has also been applied in the areas of cost allocation for water development projects 
(Suki and Nakayama, 1976; Straffin and Heaney, 1981), regional wastewater treatment 
(Giglio and Wrightington, 1972; Heaney and Dickinson, 1982; Loehman et al., 1979; 
Dinar et al. 1986; Dinar and Yaron, 1986), water quality (Kilgour et al., 1988; Dinar and 
Howitt, 1997), and transboundary water resources management (Becker and Easter, 
1997; Becker and Easter, 1998).  While this list represents application to a wide range of 
water resources problems, limited work has been reported on applying cooperative game 
theory to transboundary river basins.   
In the area of transboundary river basins, cooperative game theory has been 
applied to the Ganges-Brahmaputra (Rogers, 1969; Rogers, 1993), the Nile (Wu, 2000; 
Wu and Whittington, 2006), and the Tigris-Euphrates (Kucukmehmetoglu, 2002; 
Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004).  Additionally, cooperative game theory has 
been applied for water trading from the Nile among the Middle East countries of Egypt 
and Israel, and with the regions of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Dinar and Wolf, 
1994).  These works have shown that cooperative game theory can be used to quantify 
the benefits of cooperation among riparian countries. 
In this paper, we use cooperative game theory to quantify the benefits of 
cooperation under water sharing agreements in the transboundary Syr Darya basin. 
Water-sharing agreements can be developed in a non-cooperative setting, where each 
country attempts to maximize its own returns through independent actions, often at the 
expense of other riparian users.  This would be the case in the Syr Darya if Kyrgyzstan 




were to choose to generate all of its wintertime energy needs through hydropower 
releases from Toktogul reservoir.  However, in a cooperative negotiation framework, 
countries work together to maximize their collective benefits and seek gains beyond what 
they could get if they act individually.  This has been the motivating factor behind the 
existing Syr Darya Agreement and its proposed revisions. 
Previously, cooperative game theory methods have not been applied to the Syr 
Darya, however other forms of game theory have been used to study water sharing in the 
basin.  Non-cooperative game theory methods have been applied to evaluate water 
sharing agreements among the riparian countries in the Aral Sea basin.  These include 
interconnected games in the Amu Darya (Bennett et al., 1998), experimental games in the 
Syr Darya (Abbink et al., 2005), and a graph model for conflict resolution in the Syr 
Darya (Nandalal and Hipel, 2007). Bennett et al. (1998) applied interconnected games, a 
class of non-cooperative games where players in a weak position try to improve their 
position by linking to other issues, to the Aral Sea basin by linking air pollution 
remediation to water diversions for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Abbink et al. (2005) 
coupled a water resources planning model with experimental game theory to study the 
likelihood of water management cooperation in the Syr Darya.  Experimental game 
theory was used to determine the effect of new reservoirs in Uzbekistan on the economies 
of the basin states.  The authors’ analyses demonstrated that to maximize the benefits, 
cooperation must exist.    Nandalal and Hipel (2007) utilized a graph model for conflict 
resolution to evaluate the stability of water decisions among countries in the Syr Darya 




basin and showed that the 1992 Almaty Agreement was the most stable decision of the 
ones they considered. 
This paper uses cooperative game theory to examine the potential benefits to the 
riparian countries of the proposed revisions to the 1998 Syr Darya Agreement.  
Cooperative game theory is used to quantify the value of cooperation for the participating 
countries. Further, cooperative game theory provides ways to determine equitable 
allocations of the benefits of cooperation to the participating stakeholders as well as 
determining the likely satisfaction of countries regarding their allocation or their 
willingness to cooperate. 
 
COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY IN THE SYR DARYA BASIN 
 
In the Syr Darya basin with its four riparian countries -- Kyrgyzstan (Kg), 
Tajikistan (Tj), Uzbekistan (Uz) and Kazakhstan (Kz) -- a total of 15 coalitions or 
partnerships of the countries are possible (see Table 2).  The coalitions can range from 
individual countries acting alone (non-cooperation) to all countries cooperating (the 
Grand Coalition).  Partial coalitions are also possible.  The proposed revision to the 1998 
Agreement has allocations of the Syr Darya flow to each country as fixed percentages 
according to the 1992 Almaty Agreement (ICWC, 1992); Kyrgyzstan can divert 0.5% of 
the water, Tajikistan 7%, Uzbekistan 50.5%, and the remaining 42% is for Kazakhstan.  
The coalitions described in the following sections assume that if a coalition forms, the 
countries will work together even without the cooperation of the other countries not in the 




coalition.  Additionally, each country’s diversion is limited to the percentages described 
above regardless of whether a country is participating in a coalition, and the coalitions 
cannot restrict the diversions of non-participating countries.  
 
Table 2. Coalitions in the Syr Darya Game 
Coalition Type  Coalitions Members 
1 country coalitions  {Kg}, {Tj}, {Uz}, {Kz} 
2 country coalitions  {Kg, Tj}, {Kg, Uz}, {Kg, Kz}, {Tj, Uz}, {Tj, Kz}, {Uz, Kz} 
3 country coalitions  {Kg, Tj, Uz}, {Kg, Tj, Kz}, {Kg, Uz, Kz}, {Tj, Uz, Kz}  
4 country coalition  {Kg, Tj, Uz, Kz}  
 
 
Single Country (Independent) Coalitions 
 
When there is no cooperation, each country tends to act independently to 
maximize their individual benefits from water use.  Starting upstream, we can consider 
that when Kyrgyzstan acts independently it releases sufficient water to generate enough 
electricity to cover its internal energy demands (their agricultural water needs, diverted 
downstream of the dam, are also covered by these releases); however, there is no 
consideration of the irrigation water needs of the downstream countries.  The independent 
Kyrgyz “power” releases occur to generate wintertime hydropower.   Moving 
downstream (Figure 1), Uzbekistan receives a portion of the power releases, then 
Tajikistan receives their share; after that, Uzbekistan receives the remainder of their share 
plus agricultural return flows from Tajikistan.  Finally, Kazakhstan receives their share 




plus the return flows from Uzbekistan.  Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan all use 
their shares of the water for irrigated agriculture.  
 
Two Country Coalitions  
According to the existing agreements, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan control at most 
7.5% of the water in the basin.  They do not have sufficient influence or resources to 
benefit from forming a coalition and the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan coalition {Kg, Tj} has the 
same benefit as the sum of the single country results.   
A Kyrgyz-Uzbek coalition {Kg, Uz} could result in increased benefits over the 
independent case.  Under this coalition, Kyrgyzstan would release sufficient water to 
maximize Uzbekistan’s benefits from agricultural use of the water (subject to 
Uzbekistan’s diversion limit in the basin, 50.5%).  Tajikistan and Kazakhstan may divert 
their shares of the releases; however, their benefits are not included in the calculations for 
this coalition.  Surplus electricity (in excess of Kyrgyzstan’s domestic demand) generated 
as a result of the release to Uzbekistan, is delivered to Uzbekistan and sold in an energy 
market (while not existing at this time, there are plans for an active electricity market in 
the Central Asian region in the future).  As a result of managing the basin for 
Uzbekistan’s summertime irrigation needs, Kyrgyzstan may experience a wintertime 
energy deficit, which is compensated for by cash payments or an equivalently valued fuel 
supplement from Uzbekistan.  




Considering a Kyrgyz-Kazakh coalition {Kg, Kz}, Kyrgyzstan would release 
sufficient water to maximize Kazakhstan’s benefits from agricultural use of the water 
(again subject to diversion limits in the basin).  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan may still draw 
their share of the releases but their benefits are not included in the calculations for this 
coalition.  Surplus electricity generated as a result of these releases is delivered to 
Kazakhstan and sold in an energy market and any Kyrgyz wintertime energy deficit is 
compensated by Kazakhstan.  
In a Tajik-Uzbek coalition {Tj, Uz}, Kyrgyzstan acts independently, releasing 
sufficient water to cover its internal energy needs; however, there is no consideration of 
the downstream need for irrigation water. Tajikistan receives 7% of the power releases 
and uses this water to maximize their benefits from agricultural production. Uzbekistan 
receives 50.5% of the Kyrgyz releases plus return flows from Tajikistan and uses this 
water to maximize agricultural benefits.  Kazakhstan is still allowed to divert their share 
of the water, but their benefit is not included in the coalition value.  Surplus energy 
generated by Tajikistan (due to releases from the Kayrakum reservoir) is transferred to 
Uzbekistan who sells this power on the market.  This model assumes that Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan equally share the profits from the power sale.  
Considering a Tajik-Kazakh coalition {Tj, Kz}, they do not have sufficient 
influence or resources to benefit from forming a coalition, and the coalition value is the 
sum of the independent country results.   




The Uzbek-Kazakh {Uz, Kz} coalition of the major water users in the basin is 
very important.  In this coalition, Kyrgyzstan releases sufficient water to cover its internal 
energy demands and its 0.5% of the water.  Tajikistan receives 7% of the releases and 
uses this water for agricultural production. Uzbekistan receives 50.5% of the releases and 
Tajik return flows and uses this water for agricultural production.  Kazakhstan receives 




Under a Kyrgyz-Tajik-Uzbek {Kg, Tj, Uz} coalition, Kyrgyzstan would release 
sufficient water to cover the Uzbek and Tajik irrigation demands.  Any Kyrgyz energy 
deficit is made up for by a fuel supplement from Uzbekistan.  Uzbekistan receives the 
(optimal) water from these releases and uses this water for agricultural production. 
Surplus Kyrgyz energy is sent to Uzbekistan who sells it on the market. Tajikistan 
receives no more than 7% of the releases, and surplus hydropower generated by 
Tajikistan is transferred to Uzbekistan who sells it on the market and shares the profits 
with Tajikistan.  Kazakhstan may divert their share of the water, but there is no power 
sharing with Kazakhstan and their benefit is not included in the coalition value. 
 The draft agreement does not outline a power sharing agreement for the {Kg, Tj, 
Kz} coalition, indicating the difficulty in forming this coalition.  For our purposes, we 
take the value of this coalition to be the sum of the non-cooperative values. 




Under a Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Kazakh {Kg, Uz, Kz} coalition Kyrgyzstan releases 
sufficient water to cover both the Uzbek and Kazakh irrigation demands (subject to the 
basin diversion limits), and Kyrgyz energy deficits are compensated for by cash or fuel 
supplements from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  Tajikistan can still divert their 7% but 
there is no power sharing agreement with Tajikistan in this coalition and their benefits are 
not included in the coalition value. 
Under a Tajik-Uzbek-Kazakh {Tj, Uz, Kz} coalition, Kyrgyzstan releases 
sufficient water to produce hydropower to cover its power demand and the downstream 
countries maximize their agricultural production with their share of the power releases. 
Additionally, Tajik  hydropower is sent to Uzbekistan who sells it on the market and 
splits the profits with Tajikistan. 
 
Four Country (Grand) Coalition 
In the “Grand” Kyrgyz-Tajik-Uzbek–Kazakh {Kg, Tj, Uz, Kz} coalition 
Kyrgyzstan releases sufficient water to cover the irrigation demands of all three 
downstream countries (still observing basin diversion limits).  Surplus Kyrgyz 
hydropower is split between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in proportion to the water that 
they receive.  Kyrgyz energy deficits are compensated by fuel supplements from 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in proportion to their profits from selling the energy surplus. 
Surplus Tajik hydropower is sent to Uzbekistan who sells it on the market and splits the 
profits with Tajikistan. 




SYR DARYA RIVER BASIN OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
 
A river basin model is used to calculate the values (benefits of cooperation) of the 
coalitions discussed in the previous section.  The model, programmed in GAMS (Brooks 
et al., 2006), includes hydropower generation and agricultural production as the two 
largest uses of Syr Darya water.  The model neglects other uses such as municipal 
demands in all countries, which are small relative to agricultural water use.  The model is 
similar in extent to the Syr Darya models of Keith and McKinney (1997), GEF (2002), 
and Antipova et al. (2002) in which the main tributary flows are allocated to aggregate 
downstream water demands for beneficial use, but the level of detail is at the country 
level, or at most irrigation district level. 
The model allocates water for energy and agricultural production for one year 
with a monthly time step.  A schematic of the river network used in the model is shown 
in Figure 2. Kyrgyzstan owns and operates a cascade of 5 reservoirs (Toktogul, Kurpsai, 
Tashkumyr, Shamaldysai and Uch-Kurgan) with hydropower plants located in the lower 
reaches of the Naryn River.  The total rated capacity of the Naryn Cascade is 2,870 MW 
and the average long-term output of electric power is 10,000 million kWh/year (Antipova 
et al., 2002).  Hydropower accounts for over 90% of the electric power generation in 
Kyrgyzstan, with over 97% of the capacity concentrated in the Naryn Cascade controlled 
by Toktogul Reservoir (1200 MW).  The other reservoirs of the cascade have small 
storage capacity and provide daily or weekly control of discharges from Toktogul.  Basic 
characteristics and parameters of the Naryn Cascade are given in Antipova et al. (2002).  




Further downstream in the Syr Darya basin, Tajikistan owns and operates Kayrakum 
reservoir as a daily and seasonal reregulation reservoir with an active capacity of 2.6 km3 
and an installed power generating capacity of 126 MW.  Tajikistan draws irrigation water 
directly from the reservoir.  Various characteristics of the Syr Darya reservoirs are shown 





Figure 2. Syr Darya Basin Water Use Schematic. 
 
 
The Draft agreement deals specifically with water from the Naryn River and 
neglects water from other tributaries (ADB, 2007).  The Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan is a 
glacier fed river with a fairly large and constant annual baseflow of about 6 billion m3 per 
year.  The Draft Agreement notes that the average annual inflow to Toktogul reservoir on 
the Naryn River is 11,900 million m3 (8,900 and 14,900 million m3 for dry and wet years, 
respectively).  Additionally, the Draft agreement specifies a flow into the Northern Aral 
Sea of 5,000 million m3 per year. 




In the model, Kyrgyzstan’s energy demand (11,220 million kWh per year 
(McKinney and Kenshimov, 2000)) is satisfied by hydropower generated from releases 
from Toktogul reservoir and the Naryn cascade.  If the Kyrgyz energy demand cannot be 
met through hydropower production then energy is purchased to cover the deficit at a cost 
of $0.08 per kWh.  The operation and maintenance cost of the hydropower facilities is 
estimated to be $0.01 per kWh (Huchens, 1999). 
The model includes irrigated areas in each country (Table 4).  A number of 
different crops can be grown in each country including cotton, winter wheat, rice, fruit 
and vegetables.  In the model, the crops are aggregated into a single crop for each country 
with a single annual water demand and profit per hectare as shown in Table 4, derived 
from Keith and McKinney (1997), who analyzed farm level data from a number of 
previous studies in the basin for the negotiation of the 1998 Agreement.  Irrigation return 
flows from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are assumed to be 40% of the 
diversion.    























































      























































































































































































































































































































































A multi-objective, weighting method (Loucks et al., 1981) was formulated to 
compute net benefits to the basin countries under the conditions described above for the 
various coalitions.  The objectives of the countries include: supplying power to 
Kyrgyzstan (minimizing deficits from energy demand) and irrigation water to Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (maximizing agricultural profit).  The nonlinear model was 
programmed in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) language (Brooke et 











where Etdemand is Kyrgyzstan’s monthly hydropower demand (kWh), E
t
hydro is 
Kyrgyzstan’s monthly hydropower production (kWh), Pi ($/ha) is the agricultural net 
margin ($/ha) and Areai is the agricultural area (ha) and Max_Profiti is the maximum 
possible annual profit ($) for each country i.  The nonnegative weights wKg, wTj, wUz and 
wKz represent the relative importance of satisfying the various objectives of the countries; 
have values less than one and collectively sum to one. 
The model contains constraints for mass balance on storage in Toktogul and 
Kayrakum reservoirs for each month.  The model also includes flow balance constraints 
for each diversion and return flow point along the river.  The energy generated in 




Toktogul and Kayrakum reservoirs is a nonlinear function of the water in storage in the 
reservoir.  The run-of-the-river reservoirs in the Naryn cascade have a linear relationship 
for energy generation.  
We assume that Tajikistan does not have an appreciable demand for Kayrakum 
hydropower.  Therefore, if Tajikistan is acting independently to maximize their benefits 
from irrigation, hydropower is not generated, since Tajikistan takes it irrigation water 
directly from the reservoir. If Tajikistan is acting in a coalition, then releases through 
Kayrakum generate hydropower that is shared with Uzbekistan and there is an associated 
operation and maintenance cost of $0.01 per kWh of producing this power.   
This model only considers a single year of flow and does not consider multi-year 
storage in the reservoirs.  Several tributaries, including the larger tributaries of the 
Kardarya and Chirchik Rivers, and the smaller Angren and Keles Rivers, are neglected 
because they are not directly specified in the Agreements. The Draft Agreement deals 
with the incremental agricultural and power benefits gained from the Naryn River flows.  
Additionally, the benefits from flood control downstream in Kazakhstan are not 
considered.  Re-operation of the Kyrgyzstan dams to store winter flows to provide 
downstream flood control benefits is also not considered here.  
Five categories of water-type years, Very Wet, Wet, Normal, Dry, and Very Dry, 
are used to represent hydrologic patterns in the Syr Darya basin, corresponding to 
different hydrologic exceedance probabilities. A frequency analysis of the annual inflow 
record of 1911-2008 at the Naryn gauging station on the Naryn River (the main tributary 




of the Syr Darya flowing into Toktogul reservoir) were used to estimate hydrologic-level 
sequences used in calculating benefits of cooperation from implementing the proposed 
revisions to the 1998 treaty (see Figure 3 and Table 5).  
Table 5.  Flow Conditions, Exceedance Probability Ranges, and Corresponding Flows 






Very Low 95-100   8378 -   6525 
Low 75-95 10141 -   8378 
Average 30-75 12872 - 10141 
High 10-30 14853 - 12872 
Very High 0-10 20725 - 14853 
 
 
Figure 3.  Annual Inflows to Toktogul Reservoir 1998 – 2008 (million m3). 
 





CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS AND THE CORE 
 
The values, or characteristic functions, for the fifteen coalitions described above 
were calculated using the river basin model.  The results from the model for the non-
cooperative coalitions are listed in Table 5.  For this case, Kyrgyzstan has the benefit of 
the foregone energy cost, representing the cost to Kyrgyzstan if they had to purchase 
enough power to cover their demand from the market at a price of $0.08 per kWh.  The 
hydropower generation cost is the operation and maintenance cost of producing 
hydroelectricity at a cost of $0.01 per kWh.  The deficit energy cost is the cost purchasing 
power to cover a deficit if hydropower does not satisfy the demand.  The total benefit is 
the agricultural profit plus the difference between foregone energy cost and total energy 
cost.  The value or characteristic function of this coalition is $773 million or v(Kg) = 
$773 million.  The downstream countries each maximize agricultural profit with the 
water available to them.  Clearly, the non-cooperative situation represents a difficult 
situation for the countries since Kyrgyzstan is facing a net $13 million out of pocket 










Table 5. Value of Non-Cooperative Coalitions 
Country  Category 
Amount 
(million $ US) 
Kyrgyzstan Foregone Energy Cost  898 
 Energy Generation Cost   112 
 Deficit Energy Cost   16 
 Total Energy Cost   128 
 Agricultural Profit   3 
  Total Benefit   773 
Tajikistan Total Benefit 12 
Uzbekistan Total Benefit  81 
Kazakhstan Total Benefit  19 
 
 
For the two-country Kyrgyz-Uzbek coalition {Kg, Uz}, Kyrgyz summer releases 
to cover Uzbekistan’s irrigation demand result in an energy deficit (see Table 6).  Surplus 
energy produced from these releases is sent to Uzbekistan where it is sold.  Uzbekistan, 
in return, compensates Kyrgyzstan for their energy deficit.  The value of this coalition is 
v(Kg, Uz) = $1,076 million. A mechanism does not exist to restrict diversion to the non-
coalition countries of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.  Tajikistan and Kazakhstan have 
increased irrigation benefits, but these benefits are not included in the value of the 









Table 6. Kyrgyz-Uzbek Coalition {Kg, Uz} 
Country  Category 
Amount 
(million $ US) 
Kyrgyzstan Foregone Energy Cost   898 
 Hydro-Energy Generation Cost   113 
 Deficit Energy Cost 400 
 Total Energy Cost 113 
 Agricultural Profit 9 
  Total Benefit 794 
Tajikistan Total Benefit  41 
Uzbekistan Agricultural Profit    277 
 Surplus Energy from Kyrgyzstan  406 
 Compensation to Kyrgyzstan   400 
  Total Benefit   283 
 Kazakhstan Total Benefit   63 
Coalition  Value 1,076  
 
 
 In the Kyrgyz-Tajik–Uzbek coalition {Kg, Tj, Uz}, the Kyrgy’s release water to 
meet Uzbekistan’s agricultural demands.  Surplus energy is sent to Uzbekistan, who sell 
it on the market for a profit of $406 million and compensate Kyrgyzstan $400 million to 
cover their energy deficit (Table 7). Tajikistan also sends their hydro-energy to 
Uzbekistan who sells it for a profit of $100 million and splits this profit with Tajikistan.  








Table 7. Three country coalition {Kg, Tj, Uz} 
Country   Category 
Amount  
(million $ US) 
Kyrgyzstan  Foregone Energy Cost    898 
  Hydro-Energy Cost    113 
  Deficit Energy Cost    400 
  Total Energy Cost    113 
  Agricultural Profit    9 
   Total Benefit    794 
Tajikistan  Agricultural Profit     41 
  Hydro-Energy Cost    13 
  Compensation from Uzbekistan    50 
  Compensation from Kazakhstan    0 
   Total Benefit    78 
Uzbekistan  Agricultural Profit     277 
  Surplus Energy from Kyrgyzstan   406 
  Compensation to Kyrgyzstan    400 
  Surplus Energy from Tajikistan    100 
  Compensation to Tajikistan    50 
   Total Benefit    333 
Kazakhstan   Total Benefit    63 
 
 
The results for the Grand Coalition {Kg, Tj, Uz, Kz} are presented in Table 8 
where, Kyrgyzstan releases water in the summer to maximize downstream agricultural 
production in all of the other countries.  As a result, there is an associated deficit energy 
cost for Kyrgyzstan.  For this coalition the surplus hydro-energy produced by the summer 
releases is sent to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, who in turn sell the energy for $406 
million.  Additionally, Tajikistan produces hydropower and sends it to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan and sold for $100 million and the profits are split between the three 




countries.  The value of this coalition is the sum of the total benefits for each country for 
a total value of $1,269 million.   
Table 8. Results for the Grand Coalition {Kg, Tj, Uz, Kz} 
Country  Category 
Amount  
(million $ US) 
Kyrgyzstan Foregone Energy Cost    898 
 Hydro-Energy Cost    113 
 Deficit Energy Cost*    400 
 Total Energy Cost    113 
 Agricultural Profit    9 
  Total Benefit    794 
Tajikistan Agricultural Profit     41 
 Hydro-Energy Cost    13 
 Compensation from Uzbekistan    25 
 Compensation from Kazakhstan    25 
  Total Benefit    78 
Uzbekistan Agricultural Profit     277 
 Surplus Energy from Kyrgyzstan    203 
 Compensation to Kyrgyzstan    200 
 Surplus Energy from Tajikistan    50 
 Compensation to Tajikistan    25 
  Total Benefit    305 
Kazakhstan Agricultural Profit     63 
 Surplus Energy from Kyrgyzstan    203 
 Compensation to Kyrgyzstan  200 
 Surplus Energy from Tajikistan    50 
 Compensation to Tajikistan    25 
  Total Benefit    91 
*Covered by compensating payments from other countries 
 
 
The characteristic function for each coalition outlined above are shown in Table 9 
and used to define the Core of the cooperative game.  The Core is a set of allocations of 




the benefits to each countries such that no country will receive an allocation less than 
what they can gain by themselves without cooperation.  The Core allocations are not 
dominated by any other allocation, meaning that every country is willing to accept the 
allocation (Gillies, 1953).  Acceptable allocations have three necessary conditions; 1) 
efficiency - all coalition benefits are distributed to the coalition countries; 2) individual 
rationality - allocations are more than could be gained independent action; and 3) Pareto 
optimality - allocations sum to the value of the coalition (Gillies, 1953).  The Core 
provides bounds on the maximum that each country can expect to receive through 
cooperation and negotiation (Gilles, 1953).    The Core of the Syr Darya game is shown 
in Table 10. 









v(Kg Tj) 784 
v(Kg Uz) 1,076 
v(Kg Kz) 863 
v(Tj Uz) 186 
v(Tj Kz) 30 
v(Uz Kz) 99 
v(Kg Tj Uz) 1,205 
v(Kg Tj Kz) 803 
v(Kg Uz Kz) 1,140 
v(Tj Uz Kz) 204 
v(Kg Tj Uz Kz) 1,269 




The Core is useful for understanding transboundary river basin water sharing 
agreements because it provides bounds for possible negotiation, and it improves a 
country’s benefit beyond their non-cooperative standing.  In the Syr Darya game, the 
lower bound (Table 10) for each country is the minimum they would require to 
cooperate, whereas the upper bound is the maximum they could expect to receive through 
further negotiation.  For example, the characteristic value of the Grand Coalition, 
v(Kg,Tj,Uz, Kz), is $1,269 million. Kyrgyzstan could try to negotiate to receive up to 
$1065 million in benefits, but the minimum they would accept would be $773 million. 
Given the four-dimensional Core in the Syr Darya game, there are many allocations or 
negotiating positions available to the countries.  Cooperative game theory allocation 
concepts can be useful in illustrating the benefits of various negotiating positions.  Some 
of these allocations are discussed below. 
 





(million $ US/yr) 
Kyrgyzstan 773 1,065 
Tajikistan 12 129 
Uzbekistan 81 466 





Game theoretic methods exist for selecting a single allocation from the Core.  We 
consider two allocation methods; the Shapley value and the Nucleolus.  These methods 
use different concepts to calculate a single allocation.  The Shapely value distributes the 




gains of a coalition to individual countries based on their marginal contribution to that 
coalition (Shapley, 1953) as it enters into a forming grand coalition.  For a total of n 




s1 ! n  s ! v S  v S  j   
jS
  
where s is the number of players in a coalition S.  The characteristic function for coalition 
S is v(S) and v(S- j) is the characteristic function without country j.  The Shapley equation 
considers all coalitions containing country j.  All orderings of the countries in the Grand 






.  When country j 
joins a coalition, they are awarded the marginal benefit of     jSvSv  .   The Shapley 
allocation for a country is the average of all of the marginal benefits from the ways it can 
join the Grand Coalition.  The Shapley allocations are shown in Table 11. 
Another method for selecting an allocation from the Core is the Nucleolus.  The 
Nucleolus is calculated by finding a vector of allocations  =(1, 2, …, n) that 
minimizes the maximum of excesses, e(, S), over all coalitions S subject to 
 j
j
  v N . Where j is an allocation to country j and all allocations, j, must sum to 
the value of the Grand Coalition, v(N).  In practical terms, the Nucleolus minimizes the 
dissatisfaction of the members in the most dissatisfied coalition (Straffin, 1993).  The 
Nucleolus can be calculated as a linear programming problem and the results for the Syr 
Darya game are shown in Table 11. 




The monetary profits from cooperation in the grand coalition are shared among 
the participating countries.  Both the Shapley and nucleolus allocations lie within the core 
d in Table 10.  Each country receives an increased benefit through cooperation, as shown 
with the Shapley and nucleolus allocations (Table 11).  Uzbekistan receives the largest 
allocation beyond their independent allocation under both methodologies.  This can be 
attributed to their large agricultural production, as well as their ability to sell the surplus 
energy on the market.   
An interesting note is Kazakhstan’s allocation.  Kazakhstan receives $40 million 
with the Shapley allocation and $41.5 million with the nucleolus.  Kazakhstan earned 
larger profit than both of these allocations when they are  not participating in a coalition 
such as the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan coalition (Table 6) or the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-
Uzbekistan coalition (Table 7).  In both of these coalitions, Kazakhstan was able to gain 
$63 million since there is not a method for limiting diversions to non-coalition countries.  
The $63 million is near the upper bound of the core for Kazakhstan.   This result may 
change if flood control provided from retiming reservoir releases were included. 
 In addition to the monetary allocations, the water allocations are shown in Table 
11.  The water allocations are calculated as a percentage of the total water allocated, 
rather than the percentage of Toktogul releases.  As might be expected, under the Grand 
Coalition, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have the largest allocation of water.  These large 
allocations are due to the agricultural production in the two lower basin countries.  These 
two countries produce the largest profit from water allocations. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Once an allocation is chosen from the core, the stability of the allocation can be 
calculated which measures each country’s satisfaction with the allocation.  The Gately 
propensity to disrupt measures the loss that a country can cause on other countries by 
leaving the Grand Coalition.  The propensity to disrupt is a measure of a country’s 
negotiation strength for improving their allocation from the Grand Coalition.  The value 
compares what an individual country stands to lose by leaving the Grand Coalition 
compared to what the remaining countries in the grand coalition lose having that country 
leave. The greater the loss to the grand coalition compared to the loss of the individual 
country, the more likely the country is to leave the grand coalition if their share is not 









i  = the sum of the allocation to all players i ≠ j 
 v(j) = characteristic function for the non-cooperative for player j 
 v(N-j) = characteristic function for the Grand Coalition without player j 
  
If dj is positive and larger than a specified value, player j has a tendency to disrupt the 
















the ratio of what the players in coalition {N – j} would lose if player j left the Grand 
Coalition, to what the player j would lose by leaving the Grand Coalition.  The propensity 
to disrupt is used to eliminate imputations in the Core for which a player’s propensity to 
disrupt is higher than a specified value.   
 Table 12 shows the propensity to disrupt for each country for both the Shapley 
and the Nucleolus allocations.  Looking at the propensity to disrupt for Tajikistan under 
the Shapley allocation, Tajikistan has a propensity to disrupt of 1.42.  If Tajikistan 
decides to leave the grand coalition they will lose a total of $48 million since they forego 
the Shapely allocation for their non-cooperative value.  The other countries in the Grand 
Coalition stand to a total of 1.42 times the $48 million loss that Tajikistan received by 
exiting the coalition.   Kyrgyzstan has the lowest propensity to disrupt indicating that 
there are more satisfied with their Shapley allocation. 
 






Kyrgyzstan 1.08 3.11 
Tajikistan 1.42 4.20 
Uzbekistan 1.20 0.44 
Kazakhstan 1.18 1.00 
 
The Shapley allocation is more stable than the nucleolus allocation.  Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan have a tendency to disrupt the grand coalition as denoted by their high 
propensity to disrupt.  The nucleolus allocates a greater share of the coalition value to 




Uzbekistan to minimize their propensity to disrupt, however, by increasing Uzbekistan’s 





The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate that cooperative game theory can be 
used as a tool to quantify the benefits of cooperation among riparian nations with respect 
to water resources in a transboundary river basin.   The cooperative game theory analyses 
on the draft agreement, “Improvement of Shared Water Resources Management in 
Central Asia” demonstrates that there are increased economic benefits to all countries in 
the Syr Darya basin if they follow the cooperative arrangements outlined in the 
agreement.  The Shapely allocation provided each country with an increased economic 
benefit.  This allocation was also shown to be stable with respect to each country’s 
propensity to disrupt. The cooperative game theory concepts in this paper can be used as 
the basis for treaty negotiations.  Each country can clearly see the benefits associated 
with following the draft agreement.  Additionally, each country understands what the 
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